Opponents who could not stop a proposal alone find the few parties whose votes or resources approval needs, and agree openly to hold out together for changes.
An example
Corporate engineering at a specialty chemicals company proposed closing the maintenance shops at its five plants and moving all turnaround work to one outside contractor. The manager of the smallest plant knew her objection alone would not carry, since her site accounted for a tenth of capital spending. Approval needed the sign-off of the three largest plant managers, whose sites would supply most of the savings, and of the head of environmental health and safety, who had to certify the contractor. She called each of them. Two of the plant managers shared her worry about emergency response times; the safety head wanted the contractor's incident record first. The four sent a joint letter to the chief operating officer saying they would sign once the plan kept a minimum in-house crew at each site for unplanned shutdowns and the contractor's record had been reviewed. The proposal came back six weeks later with both conditions in it.
Why it works
One objector is easy for a sponsor to discount. This works on the proposal as it stands, making it look worse and costlier to push through. When the parties whose signatures or resources approval requires stand together, the unchanged proposal visibly lacks what it needs, and forcing it through would mean overruling all of them at once, an expensive fight for any executive. Meeting the coalition's conditions becomes the cheaper route. The members must really hold a veto or a resource, their conditions must be shared and specific, and the group must hold together when the sponsor pushes.
The thinking behind it
David A. Lax In 3-D Negotiation: Powerful Tools to Change the Game in Your Most Important Deals (2006), Lax and Sebenius describe setup moves made before talks begin: arranging that the right parties are involved, in the right sequence, with the right no-deal alternatives in play, since changing who is at the table changes what agreement is possible. Opponents who bring every party approval needs to the same side of the table change the sponsor's choice from persuading one objector to meeting the coalition's terms.
Richard M. Cyert A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963), by Cyert and March, treats the firm as a coalition whose goals are set by bargaining among members with different priorities and information, held together by side payments. On that view a large proposal is a bargain that needs enough members to agree. When the members whose consent it needs act together, the bargain has to be struck with them, which is what the joint letter forces.
When it fits
It fits when you oppose part of a proposal, cannot block it alone, and others whose approval it needs share at least some of your concern. Before you start, have a clear map of who has to sign, fund, or staff the decision, conditions specific enough that the sponsor can meet them, and a working relationship with each member sturdy enough to survive a sponsor's attempt to peel them off.
How to use it well
Build the group around the approval path, since that is where the bargaining power sits.
- Map the decision: whose sign-off, budget, people, or certification the proposal cannot proceed without. Those are the only parties that count.
- Talk to each privately about their own concerns, and find the conditions you share. Keep the list short and specific.
- Agree openly, in writing if possible, on what the group will accept, and send it to the sponsor or decision-maker under all your names.
- Offer to approve once the conditions are met, and mean it.
Expect the sponsor to approach members one at a time with a side deal. Agree in advance that anyone offered one tells the others, and keep the demands about the proposal itself, so a concession to one member helps all of you.
What it costs and where it backfires
The sponsor and their backers will remember who held out, and you may be seen as an obstacle even when the changes improved the plan. Coalitions of convenience break easily, and a member who defects leaves the rest looking obstructive. Holding out for conditions that cannot be met, or for things unrelated to the proposal, turns a legitimate check into a holdup. Kept open, conditional, and about the proposal, it is fair opposition; it stops being that where members slow the work itself, mislead the sponsor about their position, or punish colleagues who later side with the plan.
When it is used on you
Meeting a joint letter from several parties you need is information: the plan lacks support where it matters. See the group together, separate the conditions you can accept from the ones you cannot, and say which is which. Picking members off one by one tends to harden the rest. Next time, consult those parties before the proposal goes out.