Plans get approved that only add up because staff will work unpaid extra hours to keep them from failing, and the sponsor then credits the strategy when the work lands on time.
An example
Bidding a warehouse system cutover for a large retail client, a third-party logistics company came in twenty percent below the next competitor, with a staffing plan that assumed every supervisor would be fully productive through peak season. The plan had no overtime line. The vice president of operations told the executive committee the margin came from a smarter rollout sequence. On the floor, supervisors worked most Saturdays from September to January, and two shift leads skipped vacations to run parallel testing. The cutover went live a week early. The vice president presented it to the board as proof the sequencing worked and was promoted that spring. Over the next two quarters supervisor turnover at the site doubled, and the project review never set the two figures side by side.
Why it works
Two of the four ways, both on the plan itself. The plan looks better than it is, because its headline numbers count on labor the company does not pay for, and approving it looks easier, because headcount, budget, and the risk register all show acceptable figures while the overrun is paid in evenings, weekends, and health. Nothing is said against alternatives; they simply look expensive next to it. It depends on a culture where holding back effort feels like letting teammates down, accounts that do not capture unpaid hours or attrition risk, distance between the sponsor and the floor, and a habit of crediting leaders for results.
The thinking behind it
George A. Akerlof The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970) shows that a gap in information between the parties lets the better-informed side set the terms. A sponsor who knows a plan depends on unpaid hours, presenting it to approvers who see only headcount and budget lines, has that advantage. Worked-hours dashboards and attrition reports close the gap, which is why making the true labor cost visible is enough on its own.
Jonathan Baron Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation (1988), by Jonathan Baron and his coauthor Hershey, found that people rated the same decision as better and its maker as more competent when the outcome happened to be good; a large replication reproduced the direction of the effect. An on-time delivery makes the sponsor's plan look wise, whatever it cost the people who delivered it. An honest post-mortem that counts the extra hours separates the outcome from the decision.
Warning signs
Plan staffing assumes no slack and no attrition, and the budget has no overtime line. Delivery lands on time while evenings and weekends fill up with uncosted work. Turnover and sick leave creep up a quarter or two after each success. The sponsor's record of visionary results is long, and the people who delivered them do not seem to have enjoyed it.
How to defend yourself
Make the true labor cost visible. That alone is enough, without anyone having to argue that the plan was bad.
- Before approving a plan that looks suspiciously affordable, ask what staffing, hours, and attrition it assumes, and get the answer in numbers.
- Track worked hours, overtime, and attrition by project, and put them next to the delivery dates.
- Hold an honest post-mortem that counts the extra hours and names who worked them.
- If you are one of the people being counted on, record your hours and raise them with your manager before the next plan is bid on the same assumption.
Where works councils or unions exist, they turn unpaid effort into priced effort, which ends the subsidy.
How a leader shuts it down
Require every plan to show its staffing assumptions, slack, and expected overtime as line costs, and include attrition risk in the business case. Credit results to the teams that delivered them, by name, and ask what the delivery cost them. A leader with a long record of results that nobody below them enjoyed is worth a closer look.