A leader leaves a top seat open for a period, with interim arrangements in place, and lets the contenders show what they can do while the field sorts itself.
Borderline: whether this move is justified depends on the situation, and only the person in it can judge.
An example
When the head of generation at a midwestern power and gas company retired, the chief executive decided not to fill the role for nine months. He told the leadership team why: the business was moving from coal to gas and renewables, none of the three internal candidates had run that mix, and he wanted to see how each handled it. He split the role's duties among them for the interim, gave each a target, and said the appointment would come at the end of the third quarter. Two plant directors campaigned hard. The head of fuel procurement ran the weekly coordination call he had asked her to chair and hit her targets. By summer most operating decisions were coming through that call. He appointed her in October, and both directors stayed.
Why it works
With no incumbent and an open timeline, contenders have to win followers through their work in the interim, so support drifts toward whoever performs and coordinates best, and backing that person breaches no protocol. A rival's formal campaign has less to aim at, since the decision rests on results still to come, and it costs more, because campaigning makes a contender a target and has to be paid for over months. Followers converge on the visible coordinator. It needs authority to delay, a culture that tolerates ambiguity about succession, and owners or a board willing to wait.
The thinking behind it
Thomas C. Schelling The Strategy of Conflict (1960) describes focal points: people who must coordinate without communicating converge on a solution that stands out to all of them. With the formal seat empty, managers still have to take decisions somewhere, and they converge on whoever is visibly coordinating the work. That is why an informal following forms during the interim, and why an appointer who keeps the seat open can learn from where it forms.
Mancur Olson The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965) shows that a group whose members share an interest often fails to act, since each bears the cost of organizing while the benefit is shared, though small groups organize more easily. Contenders in an open field all gain from a defined process, yet each does better campaigning alone. Their defense, coordinating to demand criteria and a date, is a small group solving that problem.
Jeffrey Pfeffer Power in Organizations (1981) treats control of the decision process as a main source of power. Whoever decides when an appointment will be made holds that control in its plainest form, which is why delay is a choice with political consequences. It also explains the counter: boards, lenders, and major customers who can impose a timeline take part of that control back.
When it fits
This fits a chief executive or board with the authority to delay an appointment, an interim structure that can carry the work, and several candidates none of whom is clearly ready. It suits a period of strategic change, when how people perform in the new conditions tells you more than their records do.
How to use it well
Say openly that the seat is staying open, for how long, and why.
- Put the interim arrangements in writing: who holds which duties, with what targets and what authority.
- Give every contender the same access to you and the board, and the same information about the criteria.
- Watch who people bring their decisions to. Informal followings form quickly when the formal seat is empty, and they tell you something.
- Decide on the date you set.
Keep your own preference out of the interim until the decision; once you are seen to be steering the outcome, the contenders stop performing and start lobbying.
What it costs and where it backfires
Rivals can wear each other down, and the factional damage can outlast the appointment. Customers, lenders, or regulators may press for a named leader before you are ready, and contenders who lose often leave. Staging the vacancy turns it into deception: choosing a preferred candidate while telling rivals the field is open, or setting rivals against each other so they spend their support.
When it is used on you
Press the appointer for the criteria and a date when a needed seat stays open past its usual window. Coordinate with the other contenders to demand a defined process before you spend your support on each other, decline to escalate in public, and ask the board or a major customer to press for a named successor on a fixed timeline.