Thomas C. Schelling

Works

The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1960
Arms and Influence, 1966
Dynamic Models of Segregation, Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1, no. 2, 1971
Micromotives and Macrobehavior, Norton, 1978

In Tactics of Organizational Politics

Ideas

Credible commitment. In bargaining, the power to bind oneself can be a source of strength: a party that visibly removes its own option to retreat forces the other side to adjust. A threat works only if the other side believes it would be carried out, so making a threat credible often means giving up freedom of action in advance.

Focal points. People who must coordinate without communicating tend to converge on a solution that stands out to both, such as a famous landmark as a meeting place. Such focal points also anchor tacit bargains, which is why conspicuous, simple lines are easier to hold than arbitrary ones.

Salami tactics and compellence. A threat drawn as a line can be defeated by crossing it in slices, each too small to justify carrying out the threat. Schelling also separated deterrence, which aims to stop an opponent from acting, from compellence, a threat meant to make an opponent do something, and argued compellence is harder.

Tipping. Collective outcomes can differ sharply from what individuals intend. In his best-known model, mild individual preferences about neighbors produce strongly segregated neighborhoods, and once a threshold is crossed, a situation can tip quickly to a new state.

What it explains

Schelling explains why moves that limit one's own options, such as a public pledge or a commitment already signed, can win arguments that persuasion cannot. His work on focal points and tipping shows why positions that look settled can be stable because everyone expects them to be, and can change suddenly once enough people move.

Tactics that draw on Thomas C. Schelling (66)

In Thinking Tools

Known for

An American economist who shared the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for work on conflict and cooperation. He introduced focal points and credible commitment, and his segregation models showed how mild individual preferences can tip into stark collective patterns.