Works
- The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 1965
In Tactics of Organizational Politics
Ideas
The collective action problem. Members of a large group who would all benefit from a common goal have little individual reason to contribute, since each gets the benefit whether or not he or she pays, so large groups often fail to act without selective incentives or coercion. Small groups organize more easily, which is why concentrated interests tend to prevail over diffuse ones.
What it explains
Olson explains why a broad, scattered opposition so often fails to stop a determined few: organizing costs fall on individuals while the benefits are shared. Anything that raises the cost of coordination or splits a large group into isolated pieces makes resistance less likely.
Tactics that draw on Mancur Olson (35)
- Advisory Voice Channel
- Burnout Attrition
- Coalition-Splitting Reorganization
- Cultural Reverse Takeover
- Death by Committee
- Defending a Legacy System
- Divide and Conquer
- Engineered Brain Drain
- Engineered Leadership Vacuum
- Faction Prize Contest
- Firewall Briefing
- Holiday-Timed Rollout
- Honeymoon Mandate
- Learned Helplessness Induction
- Leaving Old Rifts Alone
- Legacy Sunsetting
- Methodology Churn
- Mobilizing the Beneficiaries
- Mushroom Management
- Nothing Is Final Feint
- Reorganization as Amnesia
- Retreat and Return
- Revolving Door Turnover
- Shock and Awe Rollout
- Silence-Means-Yes Deadline
- Silo Reinforcement
- Splitting the Critics
- Strategic Fragmentation
- Strategic Procrastination
- Talent Hoarding
- The Hammer and the Dance
- Unanimity Trap
- White Knight Delay
- Work-to-Rule
- Workload as Control