Work is organized around a few end-to-end processes, each with an owner, rather than around functions.
What it is
A process organization groups people around a few end-to-end processes, not specialties. Each process has an owner who answers for it from the customer's request to the delivered result, and teams along it do the work (Ostroff 1999, a practitioner book).
The process organization groups people around a few end-to-end processes
Select a unit or a letter to read it; the key above the drawing names the lines and letters used.
Reports toAdjust to each other directlyMMutual adjustmentOStandardization of outputsHammer and Stanton (1999): the people still report to unit heads while owners run each process, two bases at once
The structure in words
- Top management
- Top management, reports to no one. Delegates power over each whole process to its owner, Mintzberg's Type C on this explorer's reading. The profile's layers span flat to moderate, since processes and teams are argued to need fewer layers. No record says which band a flatter one drops, so this drawing shows the moderate end.
- Process owners
- Order fulfillment owner, reports to Top management, grouped by process. Answers for order fulfillment end to end, from the customer's request to the delivered result; the process unit holds the functions it needs (Ostroff 1999).
- Product development owner, reports to Top management, grouped by process. A second core process with its own owner, an integrating role across the functions the process crosses (Galbraith 1994; Ostroff 1999).
- Teams along the process
- Team along the process, reports to Order fulfillment owner. Does part of the fulfillment work and decides much of it; teams, not individuals, are the cornerstone of the design (Ostroff 1999), and work need no longer be cut into narrow tasks (Hammer and Champy 1993).
- Next team along it, reports to Order fulfillment owner. Takes the work on toward the delivered result and adjusts to the team before it directly, not through a handoff between departments.
- Team along the process, reports to Product development owner. Does the development process's work under its owner.
- Team along the process and Next team along it: adjust to each other directly, coordinated by mutual adjustment.
- By process: coordinated by standardization of outputs.
- Hammer and Stanton (1999): the people still report to unit heads while owners run each process, two bases at once
Each core process has an owner who answers for it from the customer's request to the delivered result, and teams along it do the work. The owners and their process measures standardize outputs, and the teams along a process adjust to each other directly.
Source: Ostroff 1999; Hammer and Stanton 1999; Hammer and Champy 1993; Galbraith 1994.
The form's grouping is contested on the dimensions: product or purpose, each process delivering an output to a customer (our judgment), or two bases at once, people still reporting to unit heads (Hammer and Stanton 1999). Its specialization spans low to medium (Hammer and Champy 1993); coordination spans mutual adjustment in teams and standardized outputs through owners and measures; and the lateral mechanism is the integrating role, which the owner fills (Ostroff 1999; Galbraith 1994). Those three levels are theory, resting mainly on practitioner argument. The rest is our judgment: formalization spans medium to high, since documenting processes is part of the form; centralization mixed; layers flat to moderate; decision rights span Mintzberg's (1980) Types C and D, owners holding delegated power over processes and teams deciding much of their work; moderate differentiation; exchange by bureaucracy; and a selective boundary, opened along each process.
Where the process (horizontal) organization sits on the eleven dimensions
The filled segments are the form's levels, and an outlined segment is the other view's level on a contested row; select a row for its reason and sources.
Three levels rest on theory, mainly practitioner argument: specialization, the coordinating mechanism, and the process owner as an integrating role. The other eight are judgment, and grouping is contested: in Hammer and Stanton (1999) the people still report to unit heads, two bases at once.
Source: Ostroff 1999; Mintzberg 1980, a synthesis of earlier research, offering propositions without a new test; Hammer and Stanton 1999; Hammer and Champy 1993; Kohlbacher and Gruenwald 2011a, a survey of 152 manufacturers; Galbraith 1994; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967a, a multi-firm comparative field study; Ouchi 1980, a conceptual article; Ashkenas and colleagues 1995.
Where it came from
Management writers and one scholar named it in 1990s books. Michael Hammer and James Champy's Reengineering the Corporation (1993), a practitioner manifesto, called for radically redesigning a company's processes, since work need no longer follow Adam Smith's division of labor. Jay Galbraith's Competing with Flexible Lateral Organizations (1994) cites earlier writing on organizing around core processes, so the idea predates these books. Frank Ostroff's The Horizontal Organization (1999) states the principles: organize around cross-functional core processes, install process owners, and make teams, not individuals, the cornerstone of design.
The schools of organization design and the forms' origins, 1900 to now
Each row is a school's era; each square under them is a form at its first year. Select a row or a square to read it; on a form's page, its own square and span are marked, with the schools that treat it.
The forms by first year
Schools that treat this form: Socio-technical systems; the Scandinavian and Dutch socio-technical schools; and Information processing.
The schools by first year
- Bureaucracy and its critics1900s to 1950s, revived from the 1990sWhat it claimsWeber held that rational-legal authority exercised through an office hierarchy, written rules, trained officials, and promotion by qualification is technically superior in precision, speed, and reliability. Critics studied its unintended consequences, Michels's iron law sharpest.What it has shownMerton (1940) argued, with no test, that rules can turn from means into ends; case studies followed. The Aston group concluded that the type's dimensions vary independently, and Wagner's meta-analysis (2021) found that many of their interrelationships have weakened.Who disputes itHuman relations and System 4 sets the costs of impersonal rules to motivation and cooperation against the technical superiority Weber stresses.
- Classical administration1910s to 1940s, and in German to the 1970sWhat it claimsThere are general principles of administration, among them division of work, unity of command, a scalar chain of authority, and a limited span of control, and a structure built to them will be efficient in most settings. Taylor added that planners should set work methods.What it has shownThe school offered reasoning and experience, not tests. Woodward (1965) found that the spans and levels of the more successful firms in her sample differed by production system, and Simon (1946) showed that the principles come in pairs that point in opposite directions.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory found that the structure of successful firms varies with technology and environment, where classical writers treat their principles as general.
- Human relations and System 41920s to 1960sWhat it claimsOutput depends on the social relations of work, the norms of informal groups, and the style of supervision as much as on formal design. Likert's System 4, overlapping work groups joined by linking-pin managers under participative management, outperforms authoritative systems.What it has shownThe founding evidence is the Hawthorne studies, which later reanalyses dispute (Carey 1967; Levitt and List 2011). Likert's support came largely from his own institute's surveys. Wagner (1994) found participation's effects on performance and satisfaction significant but small.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads human relations as a technique of managerial control rather than a change in the distribution of power.
- Transaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis1937, then the 1970s to the presentWhat it claimsFirms exist, and are organized as they are, to economize on transaction costs. Hierarchy replaces the market when assets are specific, uncertainty is high, and exchange is frequent, and the multidivisional form should outperform the functional form in large, diversified firms.What it has shownArmour and Teece (1978) found, in United States petroleum firms from 1955 to 1973, a positive relationship between the multidivisional form and profitability while the form was spreading, but not once an equilibrium in organizational form was reached.Who disputes itThe network perspective on organizations: Granovetter argued that the theory undersocializes economic action, which is embedded in networks of personal relations that also produce trust and order.
- The Carnegie school and the attention-based view1940s to the presentWhat it claimsPeople in organizations are boundedly rational, so structure matters because it sets the premises of their decisions and channels their attention: who sees which problems, which goals they pursue, and which routines they follow. Ocasio makes structure distribute attention.What it has shownMarch and Simon (1958) drew propositions from the existing literature, and Cyert and March (1963) added process models and simulations. Two studies show hierarchy shaping what is sent up as well as what is chosen (Reitzig and Maciejovsky 2015; Keum and See 2017).Who disputes itOrganizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities models a principal and agents with defined objectives; the Carnegie school, firms as coalitions with unresolved goal conflict.
- Socio-technical systems1950s to 1980sWhat it claimsAn organization is a social system and a technical system that must be designed together. The same technology admits more than one way of organizing work, and groups that own a whole task and control its variances at the source perform better and are more satisfied.What it has shownTrist and Bamforth (1951) found that longwall mechanization broke up self-regulating work groups. A review of 134 experiments found them extremely successful overall, and Stewart (2006) linked team autonomy to performance; studies of socialist brigades and Volkswagen qualify it.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory: Kelly argued that labor intensification, not joint optimization, accounts for what socio-technical redesign achieved, and that the part of pay incentives was seriously underestimated.
- The economics of the labor-managed firm and of enterprise ownership1958 to the presentWhat it claimsA firm run by its workers behaves differently from one run for investors: Ward modeled the Yugoslav-style firm as maximizing income per worker. Hansmann argued that an ownership form's success depends on the balance between the costs of market contracting and of ownership.What it has shownBurdín (2014) found a 29 percent lower hazard of dissolution for Uruguayan worker-managed firms than for conventional ones, and Fakhfakh, Pérotin, and Gago (2012) found French labor-managed firms as productive or more so in every industry studied.Who disputes itOrganizational economics (Jensen and Meckling) contrasts the labor-managed firm, in which tradable residual claims are legally prohibited, with cooperatives and partnerships that arise out of voluntary contracting.
- Modularity and the mirroring hypothesis1960s to the presentWhat it claimsComplex systems are built of nearly decomposable parts, and an organization's structure tends to mirror the architecture of what it makes: modular products allow loosely coupled organizations, and tightly coupled products need tightly coupled teams. Conway's law runs in reverse.What it has shownColfer and Baldwin (2016) review the empirical studies and report both support and principled exceptions. Direct tests point both ways: MacCormack, Baldwin, and Rusnak (2012) found open source products more modular than their commercial pairs; dynamic components break the mirror.Who disputes itNo school in the record disputes it head on; it answers information processing, which meets the coordination load inside the organization; mirroring writers locate it in the product's architecture.
- Strategy and structure1960s to 1980sWhat it claimsStructure follows strategy: firms that diversify by product or geography outgrow the centralized functional structure and, after a lag and usually a crisis, adopt divisions. Chandler drew this from the histories of DuPont, General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Sears.What it has shownChandler (1962) is comparative business history of four firms set against a wider survey. Rumelt (1974) related diversification and structure to performance, and Egelhoff (1988), with 34 multinationals, found some of Stopford and Wells's relationships supported and others not.Who disputes itInstitutional theory: in Fligstein's model divisions spread with a product-related or unrelated strategy, presidents from sales or finance, and other firms in the industry changing; strategy was one of three.
- Structural contingency theory1960s to the presentWhat it claimsThere is no one best structure. Performance depends on fit between structure and contingencies such as environment, technology, size, and strategy, on an open-system view of the organization. Drazin and Van de Ven separate fit as selection, interaction, and systems.What it has shownBurns and Stalker, Woodward, and the Aston group related structure to context; Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) supported selection and systems fit only. Pennings (1975) found that fit did not explain effectiveness; Schoonhoven (1981) found traditional hypotheses unsupported.Who disputes itStrategic choice: Child argued that contingency theory explains structure by the constraints of context and leaves out the political process by which power-holders choose strategic action, structural forms included.
- The French bureaucratic school (strategic analysis)1960s to 1980sWhat it claimsA bureaucracy is a system of power relations organized around zones of uncertainty. Impersonal rules and centralization protect members from depending on one another, those who control uncertainties hold power, and, unable to correct its errors, it changes only through crisis.What it has shownLe phénomène bureaucratique (1963; English 1964) rests on two case studies, a clerical agency and a state industrial monopoly. L'acteur et le système (1977; English 1980) is theoretical.Who disputes itSocietal effect and comparative business systems: D'Iribarne argues that national logics of conduct, such as a French logic of honor, explain differences that Crozier attributed to power games.
- The Japanese-firm literature1960s to the presentWhat it claimsThe large Japanese firm coordinates operating decisions through horizontal information sharing among semi-autonomous shops and uses its ranking hierarchy mainly as an incentive scheme (Aoki). It creates knowledge through middle-up-down management (Nonaka and Takeuchi).What it has shownAoki (1986) is a formal model. Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride (1986) compared 51 Japanese and 55 United States manufacturing plants, and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) rest on case studies, chiefly of Japanese firms. Fruin (1994) found the enterprise system defined at three levels.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads shop-floor delegation as control: Sewell and Wilkinson argue that just-in-time and total quality regimes delegate tactical responsibility while centralizing strategic control.
- The Scandinavian and Dutch socio-technical schools1960s to 2000sWhat it claimsThe Scandinavian program sought democracy at work through field experiments with semi-autonomous groups, then through democratic dialogue. The Dutch school's design theory turns complex organizations with simple jobs into simple organizations with complex jobs.What it has shownEmery and Thorsrud reported field experiments in Norwegian industry; Gustavsen (1992) records that they spread less than hoped, his reason for turning to dialogue. Berggren studied work organization in the Swedish auto industry. The Dutch work rests on design cases and argument.Who disputes itThe Japanese-firm literature: defenders of the Toyota system hold that standardized work with employee participation learns faster; Berggren reports Swedish long-cycle plants matching a line plant on productivity.
- Configuration theory1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructures cluster into a small number of internally coherent configurations whose elements reinforce one another, so organizations move between a few types in large jumps, not small steps. Mintzberg's five configurations each rest on one coordinating mechanism.What it has shownDoty, Glick, and Huber (1993) found that fit to Miles and Snow's ideal types predicted effectiveness while fit to Mintzberg's did not. A meta-analysis of 40 tests (Ketchen and colleagues 1997) found that configuration partly explains performance, more so with broad definitions.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Donaldson counters that most organizations sit at intermediate points on a continuum of fits, not in a few configurations, and that studies over time find mostly incremental change.
- Information processing1970s to the presentWhat it claimsThe more uncertain the task, the more information must be processed during its execution. An organization either reduces that need, through slack resources or self-contained tasks, or raises its capacity, through vertical information systems or lateral relations up to the matrix.What it has shownGalbraith (1973, 1974) built the framework from cases and from Simon's theory of bounded rationality, and Tushman and Nadler (1978) set it out as an integrating concept for design. Daft and Lengel (1986) argued that structure must reduce equivocality as well as supply data.Who disputes itThe Carnegie school and the attention-based view: Ocasio holds that firm behavior results from how the firm channels and distributes attention, so structure governs where attention goes, not only how much is processed.
- Labor process and critical theory1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructure is above all a system of control over labor. Braverman argued that management deskills work by separating conception from execution; Edwards traced a sequence from simple control by the boss to technical control through machines to bureaucratic control through rules.What it has shownHistorical and theoretical (Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979). Delbridge (1995), observing a Japanese-owned plant in England, found that just-in-time and total quality regimes combined the control of labor with management's economic goals more completely than piece rates had.Who disputes itBureaucracy and its critics: Adler argues that labor process theory ignores the progressive socialization of the labor process, which drives long-term skill upgrading, and disputes deskilling as the trend.
- Strategic choice1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructure is the outcome of choices by those with power in the organization, who decide on strategic action, including the structural form, the manipulation of environmental features, and the performance standards to be met. Context constrains but does not determine structure.What it has shownLargely conceptual: Child (1972) built the argument from gaps in contingency findings, and the empirical case rests mostly on the modest share of structural variance contingencies explain. A 2026 review of 42 studies finds upper echelons theory their main theoretical anchor.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Donaldson replies that organizations mostly adopt the structures their contingencies dictate, to avoid the loss of performance misfit brings, so choice over structure is at most limited.
- The German codetermination literature1970s to the presentWhat it claimsWorks councils and employee board seats form a structural layer through which coordination can become negotiation between management and employees. Defenders argue that it supports long-term employment, training, and cooperation; critics, that it weakens shareholder control.What it has shownJäger, Schoefer, and Heining (2021) found board-level codetermination left wages unchanged and, if anything, raised capital formation. Jirjahn (2011) reports studies pointing to positive works council effects; a meta-analysis found codetermination laws tied to lower productivity.Who disputes itOrganizational economics (Gorton and Schmid) found that firms with equal employee and shareholder representation did worse for their shareholders than firms with one-third employee representation.
- Organizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities1976 to the presentWhat it claimsDesign is the joint choice of who holds which decision rights, how performance is measured, and how it is rewarded. Rights should be placed where the specific knowledge lies, formal authority differs from real authority, and practices are complements that pay off in clusters.What it has shownIchniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) found, on 36 steel finishing lines, that lines using a set of innovative work practices achieved substantially higher productivity, consistent with complementarities. Bloom and colleagues found more decentralization where trust was higher.Who disputes itGhoshal argued that management research has shaped managers' worldview with ideologically inspired amoral theories, built on a scientific model that excludes human intentionality and so denies moral considerations.
- Institutional theory1977 to the presentWhat it claimsFormal structures are often adopted because they are legitimate in the organization's field, as rationalized myths, and then decoupled from the work done. Organizations in a field grow alike through coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism, whether or not it is efficient.What it has shownTolbert and Zucker (1983) found that city characteristics predicted early but not later adoption of civil service reform, which they read as institutionalization. Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) found support for institutional and economic accounts of late M-form adoption.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Kraatz and Zajac found little support for neoinstitutional predictions in 631 liberal arts colleges, which grew less alike; the change they studied was curricular, not structural.
- Population ecology1977 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations face strong structural inertia, because selection favors the reliability and accountability of stable structures. Change in a population's forms comes mainly from founding and failure, not adaptation, and changing core features resets the liability of newness.What it has shownAmburgey, Kelly, and Barnett (1993) found that the effects of change on the hazard of failure vary by type of change and over time, and that rates of change depend on how often and how recently an organization has changed. Carroll and Hannan (2000) set out the program's methods.Who disputes itFor structural contingency theory, Donaldson argues that ecology understates managers' capacity to adapt structure.
- Resource dependence1978 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations depend on outside parties for critical resources, and structure follows the management of that dependence: units that cope with critical dependencies gain power, and boundaries are redrawn through cooptation, joint ventures, and mergers to absorb constraint.What it has shownPfeffer and Salancik (1978) assembled studies of boards, mergers, and joint ventures. A meta-analysis of 157 tests (Drees and Heugens 2013) corroborated the main prediction: organizations meet resource dependencies with interorganizational arrangements that raise their autonomy.Who disputes itTransaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis explains boundaries by efficiency; resource dependence, by power and constraint.
- The business-groups literature1978 to the presentWhat it claimsGroups of legally independent firms bound by ownership and social ties are a durable form of their own, neither one firm nor a market. Where institutions function poorly, groups can benefit member firms and can destroy value; they are sometimes paragons, sometimes parasites.What it has shownKhanna and Palepu (2000) found that affiliates of the most diversified Indian groups outperformed unaffiliated firms. A meta-analysis of 141 studies (Carney and colleagues 2011) found that affiliation lowers performance in general, less so where institutions are underdeveloped.Who disputes itOrganizational economics: agency writers read pyramids and cross-holdings as devices that separate control from ownership; Almeida and Wolfenzon offer a financing rationale for pyramids instead.
- Scandinavian institutionalism1980s to the present
- Societal effect and comparative business systems1980s to the presentWhat it claimsFirms matched on size, technology, and industry differ systematically by country, because how a society educates, trains, recruits, and promotes its workforce, and its industrial relations, shape how work is divided and supervised, so structure is partly a national product.What it has shownMaurice, Sorge, and Warner (1980) compared closely matched manufacturing units in France, West Germany, and Great Britain and found more pervasive differences in their organization than usually recognized. Whitley (1999) set out a comparative account of business systems.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory stresses culture-free elements of structure; matched comparisons find nationally different shapes of organization.
- The network perspective on organizations1985 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations and their members are nodes joined by ties, and the pattern of ties shapes what they can do. Economic action is embedded in networks of personal relations (Granovetter 1985), and network forms are a distinct form, not a hybrid of market and hierarchy (Powell 1990).What it has shownPodolny and Page (1998) review the research and find that network forms foster learning, confer status and legitimacy, bring economic benefits, help manage resource dependencies, and give employees considerable autonomy, and they ask for attention to networks' dysfunctions.Who disputes itTransaction cost economics: Williamson treats the hybrid as a third generic form between market and hierarchy; for Powell, network forms are a distinct form, not a mix of the two.
- Computational organization design and search1990s to the presentWhat it claimsDesign choices interact, so design space is a rugged landscape with many local peaks, and structure affects how well an organization searches it. Decentralizing interdependent decisions can trap units on poor peaks; temporary decentralization, then reintegration, can help.What it has shownMostly simulation, with one field test: Csaszar (2012), with more than 150,000 stock-picking decisions by 609 mutual funds, found that decision-making structure affects the number of initiatives pursued and the omission and commission errors made.Who disputes itNo school in the record disputes it head on; it disputes structural contingency theory, whose bivariate fit, its simulations show, cannot capture how the best design depends on interactions among choices.
- The new-forms debate1990s to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations must solve four universal problems (dividing tasks, allocating them, providing rewards, and providing information), and a form is new when it solves them in new ways. Self-managing organizations radically decentralize authority; skeptics hold hierarchy reappears.What it has shownFoss (2003) traced the rise and partial reversal of Oticon's spaghetti organization to the problem of selective intervention. A meta-analysis of 54 studies of 13,914 teams (Greer and colleagues 2018) found that hierarchy within teams on net slightly lowers team performance.Who disputes itBureaucracy and its critics: removing formal structure leaves informal elites whose power is unaccountable (Freeman), and democratic and network organizations are much less hierarchy-free than their labels suggest.
- The algorithmic-management literature2015 to the presentWhat it claimsSoftware does much of the directing, evaluating, and disciplining that managers and rules once did. Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin (2020) call algorithmic control a new contested terrain; Puranam (2021) treats dividing decisions between people and machines as a design problem.What it has shownMostly qualitative field studies of gig work. Wood and colleagues (2019), with 107 interviews in six countries and 679 survey respondents, found that algorithmic management tends to give remote gig workers flexibility and autonomy, but also low pay, isolation, and overwork.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads control at work as contested terrain; Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin take up that view but argue that algorithmic control is distinct from earlier forms.
The forms by first year
- Functional structure: 1911 to 1937
- Line and staff: 1916 to 1943
- Multidivisional (M-form) by product: 1920s practice; named and analyzed 1962 to 1975
- Machine bureaucracy: 1922 (Weber); 1979 (Mintzberg)
- Divisional by customer or market segment: 1937; 2005
- Matrix organization: 1950s to 1960s practice; analyzed 1971 to 1977
- Co-determined organization: 1951 to 1976 (the laws); 1984 to 2022 (the main studies)
- Socio-technical autonomous work groups: 1951 to 1965
- Stratified hierarchy (requisite organization): 1951 to 1989
- Cooperative organization: 1958 to 1999
- Linking-pin organization (System 4): 1961 to 1967
- Divisional by region: 1962 to 1972
- Adhocracy (innovative organization): 1968 to 1979
- J-form (the Japanese firm): 1968 to 1990
- Professional bureaucracy: 1968 to 1979
- Holding company (H-form): 1972 to 1975; 1987
- Ambidextrous organization: 1976 to 2004
- Simple structure: 1979
- Hybrid structure: 1980 to the present
- Missionary (ideological) organization: 1980 to 1989
- Network, modular, and virtual organization: 1986 to 1990
- Transnational and multidimensional organization: 1987 to 1989
- Business group (keiretsu, chaebol, family house): 1988 to 2007
- Shamrock organization: 1988 to 1989
- Federal organization: 1989 to 1992
- Self-managing organization (less-hierarchical forms): 1989 to 2017
- Boundaryless organization: 1990 to 1995
- Front-back organization: 1990s to 2007
- Professional partnership (P2 form): 1990
- The corporate center and shared services: 1991 to 2000
- Internal market organization: 1993 to 1994
- Process (horizontal) organization: 1993 to 1999
- Cellular organization: 1994 to 1997
- Hypertext organization: 1994 to 1995
- Team-based organization: 1995
- Project-based organization: 2000 to 2006
- Agile at scale: 2001 to 2016
- Distributed (all-remote) organization: 2002 to 2021
- Open-source and community-based organization: 2002 to 2007
- Algorithmically managed organization: 2015 to 2020
- Team of teams: 2015
Twenty-three of the 29 schools run to the present, and 16 of those began in the 1970s or later. The forms arrive in waves: 14 of the 41 first appear between 1985 and 1994.
Source: Fayol 1949; Weber 1978; Mayo 1933; Trist and Bamforth 1951, an interview-based field study in one industry; Burns and Stalker 1961, a field study of twenty firms; Mintzberg 1979; Child 1972a; Coase 1937; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Galbraith 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Crozier 1963; Emery and Thorsrud 1969; Yoshino 1968; Streeck 1984a; Kellogg and colleagues 2020, a review of earlier research through one theoretical lens, with no new data; Puranam and colleagues 2014, a conceptual argument; Chandler 1962, several independent case histories by a historian; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Simon 1946; Maurice and colleagues 1980, a comparison of matched factories in three countries; Levinthal 1997; Simon 1962; Braverman 1974; Hamilton and Biggart 1988, a comparison of three economies by scholars; Ward 1958; Czarniawska and Joerges 1995; Granovetter 1985.
It was meant to stop the handoffs between functions from destroying speed and quality.
On the information processing school's ladder of lateral relations, from direct contact to the matrix (Galbraith 1973, 1974), the owner sits at the integrating role. The socio-technical systems school's claim, that groups owning a whole task and controlling its variances perform better, bears on the teams along each process. Stewart (2006), a meta-analysis of 93 studies, supports it: autonomy and intrateam coordination went with higher team performance, though the effect varied with task type. Two studies qualify it: Héthy (1986), a comparative review of official reports and published surveys from several countries, found autonomy far smaller than the regulations allowed, and in Fuhrich (2019), one case study, groups given control rationalized against themselves under cost pressure. Kelly (1978), a critical reanalysis of several published case studies, from the labor process school, reads what such redesign achieved as intensified labor. Adler and Cole (1993), an article by two management scholars, for the bureaucracy school, hold NUMMI's standardized work the better design for organizational learning than Uddevalla's autonomous groups; Berggren (1992), six case studies in the Swedish auto industry by one scholar, from the Scandinavian school, had argued for the Swedish long-cycle groups on productivity and quality of work.
Where it fits
Of the cells, eleven are our judgment on the premises named, and one is theory; no study found tests this form against any factor.
The process (horizontal) organization against the twelve contingency factors
Each factor at its three levels, Fits, Partial, or Strain; select a row for its reason, sources, and grade.
Across the 36 settings the cells read Fits at 12, Partial at 23, and Strain at 1, the one strain at unrelated diversification. No cell is contested, and eleven of the twelve rest on judgment; only interdependence rests on theory.
Source: Hammer and Champy 1993; Ostroff 1999; Kohlbacher and Gruenwald 2011a, a survey of 152 manufacturers; McNulty and Ferlie 2004a, one case study; Hannan and Freeman 1984; Galbraith 1994; Burton and Obel 2004; Pennings 1975, a quantitative field test of the structural-contingency model; Malnight 2001, a longitudinal comparison of two firms; Hall and colleagues 1993, a consultants' report; Van de Ven and colleagues 2013; Perrow 1967; Hickson and colleagues 1969, a multi-organization comparative survey; Mohr 1971, a quantitative field study of technology and structure; Thompson 1967; Hammer and Stanton 1999; Vera and Kuntz 2007, a survey of the hospitals of one German state; Kuntz and Vera 2007, a quantitative study of hospitals, read in its abstract; Buchanan 1997, one case study.
Your own situation against the process (horizontal) organization
Set any factor to outline its cell in the strip above; the lines under the switches give the counts, the form's place among the 41, and the misfit rules that fire.
Set: 0 of 12 factors. Fits on 0, Partial on 0, Strain on 0, Contested on 0.
Its place in the explorer's rankingEvery factor is on Any: all 41 forms tie, and the explorer lists them alphabetically.1st of 411st of 41, tied with one other1st of 41, tied with 0 othersSunk by a misfit rule: 1st of 41Sunk by a misfit rule: 1st of 41, tied with one otherSunk by a misfit rule: 1st of 41, tied with 0 others
- Flagged (its sources disagree): A prospector bound by heavy rules. Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006; Adler and Borys 1996.
- Flagged (its sources disagree): A small organization with a large one's rules. Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006.
- Flagged (its sources disagree): Nonroutine work bound by procedures. Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Adler and colleagues 1999; Adler and Borys 1996; against it, Hickson and colleagues 1969; Child and Mansfield 1972.
- Flagged (its sources disagree): Heavy rules in an unpredictable environment. Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006; Bigley and Roberts 2001; Adler and Borys 1996.
- Flagged (its sources disagree): Reactor: a defender's structure kept after the environment changed. Disputed: Miles and Snow 1978; Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006; Bigley and Roberts 2001; Adler and Borys 1996.
Ranking rule: by count of Fits on the factors the reader has set, then fewest Strains, then alphabetical; a fired misfit rule that no source disputes sinks the form to the bottom when every level of the form's profile meets it, a disputed one, or one that meets the form only through one end of a spanned level, one view of a contested profile cell, or one part of a two-part form, is flagged on the row (with both views where it is disputed), and a misfit between two of the reader's own settings is shown once above the list; a contested cell counts only where its views agree at the reader's level, and otherwise shows as Contested; factors on "Any" count for nothing; with every factor on "Any" the list is alphabetical and says so.
Open these settings in the explorer
The misfit rules that can fire for this form
- A prospector bound by heavy rules fires when Strategy type at Prospector (exploration): flagged (its sources disagree). Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006; Adler and Borys 1996.
- A small organization with a large one's rules fires when Size at Small: flagged (its sources disagree). Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006.
- Nonroutine work bound by procedures fires when Technology and routineness at Nonroutine: flagged (its sources disagree). Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Adler and colleagues 1999; Adler and Borys 1996; against it, Hickson and colleagues 1969; Child and Mansfield 1972.
- Heavy rules in an unpredictable environment fires when Environmental uncertainty (unpredictability, dynamism) at Unpredictable: flagged (its sources disagree). Disputed: Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006; Bigley and Roberts 2001; Adler and Borys 1996.
- Reactor: a defender's structure kept after the environment changed fires when Strategy type at Defender (exploitation) and Environmental uncertainty (unpredictability, dynamism) at Unpredictable: flagged (its sources disagree). Disputed: Miles and Snow 1978; Burton and Obel 2004; against it, Sine and colleagues 2006; Bigley and Roberts 2001; Adler and Borys 1996.
Five of the 39 contingency misfit rules can fire for this form, all at the top of its formalization band, and none sinks it: each is disputed and meets only that end of the band, so all five only flag it.
Source: Burton and Obel 2004; Burton and colleagues 2020a.
- Size. Partial small, fits medium and large: handoffs multiply with size, and a small firm has few functions to cross (premises Hammer and Champy 1993; Ostroff 1999).
- Age. Partial young, fits established, partial old: the form usually redesigns an established functional firm, and in old ones change tends to settle on top of the old structure (premises McNulty and Ferlie 2004, one case study; Hannan and Freeman 1984 on inertia).
- Environmental uncertainty. Fits stable and shifting, partial unpredictable: standardized processes give speed and quality where work can be specified ahead, while a changing environment forces continual redesign (premises Galbraith 1994; Burton and Obel 2004, whose model, the most developed scholarly fit model, pairs turbulence with a flexible structure).
- Environmental complexity. Partial simple and moderate, fits complex. Nearest premise: Malnight (2001), a longitudinal comparison of two multinationals whose structures differed by process under complex competition, not process ownership. Pennings (1975), a quantitative field test of the structural-contingency model, limits the uncertainty and complexity cells: environment and structure fit did not explain effectiveness.
- Munificence and hostility. Partial throughout: owners can speed a response, but redesign is costly when resources are short. Burton and Obel's rules address only hostility, keeping formalization low, and Hall, Rosenthal, and Wade's (1993) consultants' report is not tied to the environment; neither premise settles it.
- Diversity. Fits single business, partial related, strain unrelated: unrelated businesses run different processes, so one design cannot span them (premise Ostroff 1999).
- Strategy. Fits defender, partial analyzer and prospector: owned processes raise efficiency where steps are known, and a prospector's new domains have no settled process (premises Hammer and Champy 1993; Ostroff 1999). The third premise cuts against it: Burton and Obel (2004) prescribe for a defender high formalization and centralization and a functional configuration.
- Technology. Fits routine and mixed, partial nonroutine: a process can have an owner only if its steps can be mapped (premise Van de Ven, Ganco, and Hinings 2013 on systematized and developmental programs). Hickson, Pugh, and Pheysey (1969), a multi-organization comparative survey, and Mohr (1971), a quantitative field study of technology and structure, limit this cell; Donaldson (2001) lays Mohr's null, and Pennings's, to method.
- Interdependence. Partial pooled, fits sequential, partial reciprocal, as theory (conceptual): a process unit groups sequential work, which Thompson (1967) ranks second after reciprocal work; reading the owner as that grouping is our judgment, and reciprocal work between processes still needs lateral links.
- Knowledge intensity. Partial throughout: in hospitals, where core work is professional, Vera and Kuntz (2007), a survey of one German state's hospitals, and Kuntz and Vera (2007), a quantitative study of hospitals, found efficiency gains, while McNulty and Ferlie (2004) and Buchanan (1997), one case study each, found limits; none varies knowledge intensity.
- Global integration. Partial low and moderate, fits high (premise Malnight 2001).
- Local responsiveness. Partial throughout: processes can be standardized across countries or differentiated by them (premise Malnight 2001).
What it does well
It gives the whole an owner: a process owner answers for what the customer receives, and teams along the process settle handoffs themselves (Ostroff 1999; Hammer and Stanton 1999, both practitioner sources), though two surveys qualify the owner's part. Kohlbacher and Gruenwald (2011b), a survey of manufacturing firms in one country, found the owner role alone, or process measurement alone, not enough for high firm performance; firms needed both. Hernaus and colleagues (2016), a survey of many organizations in two countries, public and private, found formal process roles and specialized units drove the success of process management initiatives, which did best where a strategic approach came with a central responsibility and decentralized process owners; the outcomes were the initiatives', not the firm's.
Kohlbacher (2010), a review of 26 published reports, mostly cases and claims, found positive effects predominant, most often on speed, customer satisfaction, quality, and cost. He notes a possible bias toward good news and few quantitative studies; it is not a meta-analysis.
For five complaints, the symptom view offers it: on contested theory, work stalling at handoffs (after Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, a multi-firm comparative field study, and Hammer and Champy 1993) and no one owning the customer's experience end to end (for both, a second view drops it, on Byrne and colleagues' 2004 survey of medical centers); on our judgment, turf wars, meeting overload, and units hitting their own numbers while the whole slips.
What it costs
It costs a second structure. The specialties still need a home, so unit heads keep the people and develop them, while owners hold the design, the measures, and training in the process (Hammer and Stanton 1999). The owner's job is permanent, since process designs must evolve as conditions change.
It also costs upkeep, on our reading: process orientation, as Kohlbacher and Gruenwald (2011a), a survey of 152 manufacturers, measured it, includes documentation, measurement, improvement methods, and a matching culture, which the study does not cost.
Its usual change program is faulted on people: Willmott (1994), a critical review, found reengineering's vision cursory on the human side, a critique of the prescriptions, not a measured cost.
How it fails
How the process (horizontal) organization fails, and the coordination failures behind it
The entry's failure modes at the left, each tied to the Coordination Failures patterns it names at the right; a pattern links its entry there.
How many ties the failure has. Highest: Process gains that never reach the wholeProcess owners and unit heads both claim the workThe old functions shape the redesign and outlast itEach process becomes a new siloThe mapped process falls behind the workLocal optimization against the global constraintJurisdictional gap or overlapSubsystem self-perpetuationSiloed knowledgeModel-world divergence
| Failure | Degree |
|---|---|
| Process gains that never reach the whole | 1 |
| Process owners and unit heads both claim the work | 1 |
| The old functions shape the redesign and outlast it | 1 |
| Each process becomes a new silo | 1 |
| The mapped process falls behind the work | 1 |
| Local optimization against the global constraint | 1 |
| Jurisdictional gap or overlap | 1 |
| Subsystem self-perpetuation | 1 |
| Siloed knowledge | 1 |
| Model-world divergence | 1 |
Five failure modes name five patterns, one each: local optimization, a jurisdictional gap or overlap, subsystem self-perpetuation, siloed knowledge, and model-world divergence.
Source: Hall and colleagues 1993, a consultants' report; Hammer and Stanton 1999; Buchanan 1997, one case study; McNulty and Ferlie 2004a, one case study; Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1994.
Process gains that never reach the whole. Hall, Rosenthal, and Wade (1993), a consultants' report: in all too many companies, reengineering improved individual processes dramatically while overall results declined. Local optimization, on our reading.
Process owners and unit heads both claim the work. Hammer and Stanton (1999), a practitioner article, report that at Duke Power process owners and regional vice presidents at first acted more as rivals than partners, until the managers wrote a decision rights matrix. Undrawn, that line leaves decisions owned twice or not at all, on our reading (jurisdictional gap or overlap).
The old functions shape the redesign and outlast it. Buchanan (1997), one case study, found reengineering's imprecision let political actors shape its terms; McNulty and Ferlie (2004), one case study, found change sedimented. Hammer and Stanton warn that without strong process owners the old structures soon reassert themselves. Subsystem self-perpetuation, on our reading.
Each process becomes a new silo. Without links between processes (the interdependence cell; Galbraith 1994), what one process learns stays there (siloed knowledge); our reading.
The mapped process falls behind the work. Buchanan found the complexity and indeterminacy of the patient trail diluted the redesign. Where steps cannot be specified ahead, the map stops matching the work (model and world divergence); our reading.
At the top of the form's formalization band, five misfit rules fire, all contested, so they flag the row and sink nothing. In four, Burton and Obel (2004), in propositions not tested one by one, call heavy rules a misfit for a small organization, a prospector, an unpredictable environment, and nonroutine work. Against the first three, formalized founding teams outperformed in Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch (2006), a quantitative study of new ventures in one sector; against the third, a bureaucratic incident command system proved flexible in Bigley and Roberts (2001), one inductive case study. Against the last, a bureaucratic plant handled nonroutine work in Adler, Goldoftas, and Levine (1999), one case study, and Child and Mansfield (1972), a multi-firm comparative study, found size bore on structure far more than technology. Adler and Borys (1996), a conceptual argument, separate enabling from coercive formalization. The fifth, a defender's rule-bound structure in an unpredictable environment (after Miles and Snow's 1978 reactor), is our judgment, and the counter-views to the third dispute its rule-bound half.
What the research found
Most of the research surveys process orientation, and its results disagree. Kohlbacher and Reijers (2013), a survey of Austrian manufacturers, found process measurement, structure, improvement methods, and above all culture positively associated with performance. Škrinjar and colleagues (2008), a survey of companies in one transition economy, found process orientation led to better non-financial and, through it, financial performance. Leyer and colleagues (2017), a survey of 1,069 employees in one industry, found structure and process improvement encouraged operational performance and innovation. Against them, Santos and colleagues (2014), a survey of 368 companies, found culture and human resource management associated with performance but no significant direct link for the structure items (process managers on the chart, cross-process teams), which the authors suggest may moderate, not cause. All measure orientation, of which structure is one part; none compares forms. Grint (1994), a critical essay with no new data, disputes some of reengineering's claims to novelty and internal coherence.
Zhang, Bhuiyan, and Kong (2018), a formal model compared with industry data, is the most recent study filed under this form and the record's one item from eight main journals since 2010; it models structure under process change, not this form, of which a search of those journals found no study. Škrinjar and colleagues' replication found a stronger link than the original, but for orientation as a whole, not structure.
Vera and Kuntz (2007), a survey of the hospitals of one German state, found a high degree of process-based organization had a moderate but significant positive effect on efficiency, depending on physicians' participation and an adequate culture; Kuntz and Vera (2007), a quantitative study of hospitals, probably not independent of the first, found process orientation raised efficiency though modularization as a whole did not. Against them stand the two hospital case studies in How it fails and Byrne and colleagues (2004), a survey of every medical center in one national health system: clinical service lines had no favorable and several unfavorable effects on the utilization measures. Treating them as the nearest tested case is our reading. Ocasio's (1997) attention-based view, from the Carnegie behavioral school, dissents from the information processing account: structure governs where attention goes.
The evidence ledger holds 16 studies filed under this form.
In practice: one published case
This is one case study, from McNulty and Ferlie (2004), an article in Organization Studies. The article calls the site a UK National Health Service hospital; the authors' companion book names it the Leicester Royal Infirmary, a large NHS teaching hospital.
The hospital implemented business process reengineering in an attempt to effect a transformatory shift to a new form of process organization, in a large and complex public service organization.
The reengineering fell short of its intent. The authors' data revealed important limits to the intended transformation: change was sedimented rather than transformational. The setting bears on it: a large, complex, professionalized public service organization, and a radical strategy driven from the top.
The authors concluded that radical top-down change strategies are limited in large, complex, professionalized public service organizations, and that intended moves to post-new-public-management forms may remain contained in scope.
Three cautions apply: it is one hospital, so it shows what can happen, not how often; the case record rests on the article's abstract, which reports no figures on cost, waiting times, or clinical results, so this page reports none; and the abstract does not say how the hospital regrouped its work, so this page does not say either.
Source: McNulty and Ferlie 2004a. Process transformation: limitations to radical organizational change within public service organizations, Organization Studies 25(8), 1389 to 1412; one case study.
Variants and near relatives
Process enterprise with process owners. Hammer and Stanton's (1999) design, a practitioner article: owners design and measure each process end to end, while the people report to unit heads.
Lean value-stream organization. A practitioner design (Womack and Jones 1996) that organizes people around the value stream in place of departments. The flow of work belongs to Workflow Topologies, and shop-floor authority to the J-form's Toyota production system. Skinner's (1974) plant within a plant, under Multidivisional, gives each unit in one site its own functions for one manufacturing task.
The Functional structure, the nearest neighbor, makes the specialty the unit, so a process crosses departments that each own one step; this form makes the end-to-end process the unit and names one owner for it.
Clinical service lines, under the professional bureaucracy, regroup a hospital's work by patient group across departments, closer to the customer division than to one owned process. The Team-based organization designs the whole organization as a system of teams; this form staffs processes with teams but makes the process and its owner the unit. Socio-technical autonomous work groups fit each group to a segment of a production system, not to a process running to the customer. The Matrix organization gives people two bosses; here each keeps one line to a unit head.
The process organization beside its nearest neighbor, the functional structure
Select a number to fill what it marks in both drawings; the list under them gives the dimensions on which the two profiles differ.
The end-to-end process, from the customer's request to the delivered result, is the unit of the organization, with one owner accountable for each process across the functions it crosses, where the functional form makes the specialty the unit and leaves the process to the handoffs between departments.
Process (horizontal) organization
Reports toAdjust to each other directlyMMutual adjustmentOStandardization of outputsHammer and Stanton (1999): the people still report to unit heads while owners run each process, two bases at once
- Units are grouped by process, each delivering an output to a customer, while the functional structure groups them by the kind of work they do; in Hammer and Stanton (1999), people also still report to unit heads.
- Each process has an owner who answers for it from the customer's request to the delivered result; in the functional structure the functions meet only at the chief executive.
- Teams along a process adjust to each other directly, where direct supervision through the chief executive coordinates across the functional structure's functions.
- Owners and process measures standardize outputs, where standard ways of working coordinate the work inside each function.
Differs on 10 of 11 dimensions
- Basis of grouping Product or purpose; Functional structure: Function or process
- Specialization Low to medium; Functional structure: Medium to high
- Standardization and formalization Medium to high; Functional structure: Medium
- Centralization Mixed; Functional structure: Centralized
- Layers and span of control Flat to moderate; Functional structure: Moderate
- Decision rights and the locus of authority Limited vertical decentralization to selective vertical and horizontal decentralization; Functional structure: Vertical and horizontal centralization
- Prime coordinating mechanism Mutual adjustment and standardization of outputs; Functional structure: Direct supervision and standardization of work processes
- Lateral mechanisms Integrating roles and managerial linking roles; Functional structure: Hierarchy, rules, and goals only
- Differentiation against integration Moderate differentiation, some integrating roles; Functional structure: Low differentiation, light integration to moderate differentiation, some integrating roles
- Boundary permeability Selective; Functional structure: Closed
Each runs its work inside one hierarchy. The process organization makes each end-to-end process a unit with an owner, where the functional structure makes the specialty the unit and leaves a process to the handoffs between departments.
Source: Ostroff 1999; Hammer and Stanton 1999; Galbraith 1994; Fayol 1949; Williamson 1975; Taylor 1911.
Moving into or out of it
Most firms come from a functional structure (the age cell, our judgment). Hammer and Stanton (1999), a practitioner article, advise pruning other change programs, naming respected executives as owners at once, measuring by process from the outset, and seeking early gains. They warn of years of effort and resistance mostly from senior executives, and find it not uncommon for a quarter to a half of the senior team to leave.
Buchanan (1997), one case study, found rapid, blank-sheet change impractical. No study here measures the cost of moving into this form. On our reading of clinical service lines as the nearest case, Byrne and colleagues (2004), a survey of every medical center in one national health system, found new lines improved significantly less over time than facilities with none, which the authors read as a possible initial period of disruption; facilities chose whether to adopt, and the measures were utilization. Change & Transformation covers running a reorganization.
The thinking behind it
Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation (1993), a practitioner manifesto: radical process redesign, the form's case against narrow jobs.
Frank Ostroff, The Horizontal Organization (1999), a practitioner book: organize around a few core processes with owners and teams.
Jay Galbraith, "Organization design: an information processing view" (1974): task uncertainty drives the information load, and lateral relations raise capacity to carry it; the owner is the integrating role.
James Thompson, Organizations in Action (1967): pooled, sequential, and reciprocal interdependence; propositions later tested by others. It explains why a process unit groups sequential work.
Terry McNulty and Ewan Ferlie (2004), one case: an attempted shift to process organization in a professionalized public hospital produced sedimented change. David Buchanan (1997), one case: reengineering's imprecision lets political actors shape it, and processes' indeterminacy dilutes redesign.
Michael Hannan and John Freeman (1984): selection favors structures with high inertia, inertia rises with age, and attempts at reorganization raise death rates, the premise for old organizations. Tests show the effects vary by type of change, and Donaldson (1995) argues, in a disputed critique, that ecology understates managers' capacity to adapt.
Also called
Horizontal organization (Ostroff 1999), process-centered organization, and process enterprise (Hammer and Stanton 1999). The surveys say process orientation (Kohlbacher and Gruenwald 2011a); Malnight (2001) writes of process-based structures.
Process here means an end-to-end flow of work ending at a customer, not Gulick's (1937) grouping by major process, which groups by specialty.
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