Stratified hierarchy (requisite organization)

The number of managerial layers is set by the time span of discretion each role requires, so each layer adds a real step in the complexity of work.

What it is

A stratified hierarchy is one line of managers whose layers are set by the work, not by headcount. Elliott Jaques measured each role by its time span of discretion, the longest task its holder must carry out without review, and argued that a real managerial layer begins where that time span crosses a boundary. In 1990 he set the boundaries at three months, one, two, five, ten, and twenty years, and seven layers are enough for all but the largest corporations. Each layer is meant to add a real step in the complexity of work (Jaques 1989), and the manager one stratum up is accountable for subordinates' output and coordinates them by direct supervision.

The stratified hierarchy sets each layer by the time span of the work

Illustrative. Five of Jaques's seven strata, each band labeled with its time span of discretion; select a unit or the letter to read it.

Reports toAdjust to each other directlyDDirect supervision

Select a unit or a letter to read it. D, direct supervision: One person takes responsibility for the work of others, giving instructions and monitoring their actions.Stratum V manager. Layer: V: 5 to 10 years. Reports to no one. The top role in this drawing; Jaques says seven layers are enough for all but the largest corporations.Stratum IV manager. Layer: IV: 2 to 5 years. Reports to Stratum V manager. By function or by product. A role one stratum down, grouped here by function; the theory is silent on the horizontal basis.Stratum IV manager. Layer: IV: 2 to 5 years. Reports to Stratum V manager. By function or by product. A role at the same stratum, grouped here by product, the other common single-line basis.Stratum III manager. Layer: III: 1 to 2 years. Reports to Stratum IV manager. Holds discretion bounded by its time span, with accountabilities and authorities specified for the stratum and the content of the work left to the holder.Stratum III manager. Layer: III: 1 to 2 years. Reports to Stratum IV manager. Joined to a role in another managerial unit by a lateral role relationship, such as a collateral or coordinating one, each with its authority set out (Jaques 1976). Jaques (1989) also sets out task forces and project teams beside the line, so the form's lateral mechanisms reach that far.Stratum II manager. Layer: II: 3 months to 1 year. Reports to Stratum III manager. A layer that adds a real step in the complexity of work, not a relay added for headcount.Stratum II manager. Layer: II: 3 months to 1 year. Reports to Stratum III manager. Accountable for the output of the roles one stratum down.Front-line role. Layer: I: up to 3 months. Reports to Stratum II manager. A role whose longest task runs under three months, the first stratum.Front-line role. Layer: I: up to 3 months. Reports to Stratum II manager. Defined by the level of work it carries rather than by a narrow specialty.D, direct supervision. One person takes responsibility for the work of others, giving instructions and monitoring their actions.

The structure in words

V: 5 to 10 years
- Stratum V manager, reports to no one. The top role in this drawing; Jaques says seven layers are enough for all but the largest corporations.
IV: 2 to 5 years
- Stratum IV manager, reports to Stratum V manager, grouped by function or by product. A role one stratum down, grouped here by function; the theory is silent on the horizontal basis.
- Stratum IV manager, reports to Stratum V manager, grouped by function or by product. A role at the same stratum, grouped here by product, the other common single-line basis.
III: 1 to 2 years
- Stratum III manager, reports to Stratum IV manager. Holds discretion bounded by its time span, with accountabilities and authorities specified for the stratum and the content of the work left to the holder.
- Stratum III manager, reports to Stratum IV manager. Joined to a role in another managerial unit by a lateral role relationship, such as a collateral or coordinating one, each with its authority set out (Jaques 1976). Jaques (1989) also sets out task forces and project teams beside the line, so the form's lateral mechanisms reach that far.
II: 3 months to 1 year
- Stratum II manager, reports to Stratum III manager. A layer that adds a real step in the complexity of work, not a relay added for headcount.
- Stratum II manager, reports to Stratum III manager. Accountable for the output of the roles one stratum down.
I: up to 3 months
- Front-line role, reports to Stratum II manager. A role whose longest task runs under three months, the first stratum.
- Front-line role, reports to Stratum II manager. Defined by the level of work it carries rather than by a narrow specialty.

Stratum III manager and Stratum III manager: adjust to each other directly (Lateral relationship).

A real managerial layer begins where the time span of discretion, the longest task a role must carry out without review, crosses one of Jaques's boundaries. The manager one stratum up is accountable for subordinates' output and coordinates them by direct supervision.

Source: Jaques 1990; Jaques 1976; Jaques 1989.

In this form's profile, grouping spans function or process and product or purpose, since the theory is silent on it. Specialization is medium, by level of work. Formalization is medium: accountabilities are specified, the content of the work is not. Centralization is mixed, with decision rights at vertical and horizontal centralization. Differentiation is low and integration light; exchange is Ouchi's (1980) bureaucracy, matched to Jaques's (1976) employment hierarchy of accountable managers; and boundaries are closed. All of those are our judgment, and three others rest on theory: layers and span are moderate, on Jaques's (1990) seven layers; the prime coordinating mechanism is direct supervision; and lateral mechanisms span direct contact and liaison to task forces and teams, because Jaques (1976, 1989) defines collateral, advisory, and coordinating role relationships, later task forces and project teams, and calls defining them essential; the mapping onto the scale is ours.

Where the stratified hierarchy (requisite organization) sits on the eleven dimensions

The filled segments are the form's levels; select a row for its reason and sources.

Select a dimension to read why the form sits there, and on what basis.Basis of grouping: Function or process and product or purpose. Basis: Judgment. Jaques's theory sets the vertical structure, the strata, and is silent on the horizontal basis; the two common single-line bases are recorded as judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976; Jaques 1990.Specialization: Medium. Basis: Judgment. Roles are defined by the level of work they carry rather than by narrow specialty; the band is judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976.Standardization and formalization: Medium. Basis: Judgment. Role accountabilities and authorities are specified for each stratum, while the content of the work is left to the role holder within its time span; the band is judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976; Jaques 1990.Centralization: Mixed. Basis: Judgment. Each role holds discretion bounded by its time span, with the manager one stratum up accountable for subordinates' output; the band is judgment. Sources: Jaques 1990.Layers and span of control: Moderate. Basis: Theory. The number of layers is set by bands of time span of discretion, and Jaques says seven layers are enough for all but the largest corporations, fewer than headcount-driven hierarchies accumulate. Sources: Jaques 1990; Jaques 1976.Decision rights and the locus of authority: Vertical and horizontal centralization. Basis: Judgment. Formal authority runs down a single line of accountable managers, and nothing in the theory moves power out of the line to analysts or operators; judgment, as Jaques does not use Mintzberg's types. Sources: Jaques 1990; Mintzberg 1980.Prime coordinating mechanism: Direct supervision. Basis: Theory. Direct supervision by a manager one stratum up who is accountable for the subordinate's output. Sources: Jaques 1990.Lateral mechanisms: Direct contact and liaison roles to task forces and teams. Basis: Theory. Beside the manager line, Jaques defines lateral role relationships between roles in different managerial units, among them collateral, advisory, coordinating, monitoring, and service-getting relationships, each with its authority set out, and later secondment and attachment task forces and project teams; he calls the construction and definition of lateral relationships essential. Sources: Jaques 1976; Jaques 1989.Differentiation against integration: Low differentiation, light integration. Basis: Judgment. Units are distinguished by level of work rather than by orientation, and the managerial hierarchy integrates them; judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967a.Mode of exchange and control: Bureaucracy. Basis: Judgment. Jaques titles his theory one of bureaucracy, an employment hierarchy of accountable managers; matching that to Ouchi's bureaucracy is judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976.Boundary permeability: Closed. Basis: Judgment. Movement across levels runs through the formal managerial line; judgment. Sources: Jaques 1990; Ashkenas and colleagues 1995.

Three of the eleven levels rest on theory, none on evidence, and eight on judgment. No row is contested.

Source: Jaques 1976; Jaques 1990; Mintzberg 1980, a synthesis of earlier research, offering propositions without a new test; Jaques 1989; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967a, a multi-firm comparative field study; Ashkenas and colleagues 1995.

How span of control sets the layers of a hierarchy

Move the sliders to see how many layers of managers a front line needs at a given span, how many relationships a manager with that span must keep in mind, and the stratum that the role's longest task puts it in. The span starts at two, because with a span of one no number of layers reaches a second person. Where the front line is not an exact power of the span, rounding up to a whole layer is the calculator's rounding, not Williamson's.

People at the front line1,000

Span of control5

Longest task in the role, in months12

Layers of managers above the front line5One person needs no layer above them. $L = ⌈ \log_{s} N ⌉$ , the smallest whole number L with $s^{L} \geq N$ , counted by whole-number multiplication. Williamson 1967, a theoretical model.
Relationships for a manager with this span100 $s (2^{s - 1} + s - 1)$ , every direct single, direct group, and cross relationship counted. Graicunas 1933, a conceptual argument with no test.
The role's stratumStratum IIILongest task under three months.Longest task three months to under one year.Longest task one year to under two years.Longest task two years to under five years.Longest task five years to under ten years.Longest task ten years to under twenty years.Longest task twenty years or more.Boundaries at three months and one, two, five, ten, and twenty years; a task exactly at a boundary falls in the stratum that begins there. Jaques 1990.

Layers of managers above the front line
Span	10 people	100 people	1,000 people	10,000 people
2	4	7	10	14
3	3	5	7	9
4	2	4	5	7
5	2	3	5	6
6	2	3	4	6
7	2	3	4	5
8	2	3	4	5
9	2	3	4	5
10	1	2	3	4

$L = ⌈ \log_{s} N ⌉$ , the smallest whole number L with $s^{L} \geq N$ , counted by whole-number multiplication. Williamson 1967, a theoretical model.

Relationships for a manager with this span
Span	Relationships
1	1
2	6
3	18
4	44
5	100
6	222
7	490
8	1,080
9	2,376
10	5,210
11	11,374
12	24,708

$s (2^{s - 1} + s - 1)$ , every direct single, direct group, and cross relationship counted. Graicunas 1933, a conceptual argument with no test.

Jaques's strata
Stratum	Longest task in the role
I	Under three months
II	Three months to under one year
III	One year to under two years
IV	Two years to under five years
V	Five years to under ten years
VI	Ten years to under twenty years
VII	Twenty years or more

Boundaries at three months and one, two, five, ten, and twenty years; a task exactly at a boundary falls in the stratum that begins there. Jaques 1990.

Layers grow only with the logarithm of the front line, so a wider span flattens a hierarchy fast. Relationships grow far faster than the span: going from four subordinates to five raises them from 44 to 100. Jaques set the layers by the time span of the work instead of by headcount.

Source: Williamson 1967, a theoretical model; Graicunas 1933, a conceptual argument with no test; Jaques 1990.

Where it came from

The form came out of manufacturing, in one British factory. In 1948 the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations began a study of group stress in industry at the Glacier Metal Company, and Elliott Jaques, a psychoanalyst, led the project. His 1951 book, The Changing Culture of a Factory, follows the Works Council, payment, and changes in the executive system.

The schools of organization design and the forms' origins, 1900 to now

Each row is a school's era; each square under them is a form at its first year. Select a row or a square to read it; on a form's page, its own square and span are marked, with the schools that treat it.

The forms by first year

Schools that treat this form: Classical administration; Organizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities.

Select a school's row or a form's square to read it.Select a form's square to read it; open a school below.Bureaucracy and its critics1900s to 1950s, revived from the 1990sWhat it claimsWeber held that rational-legal authority exercised through an office hierarchy, written rules, trained officials, and promotion by qualification is technically superior in precision, speed, and reliability. Critics studied its unintended consequences, Michels's iron law sharpest.What it has shownMerton (1940) argued, with no test, that rules can turn from means into ends; case studies followed. The Aston group concluded that the type's dimensions vary independently, and Wagner's meta-analysis (2021) found that many of their interrelationships have weakened.Who disputes itHuman relations and System 4 sets the costs of impersonal rules to motivation and cooperation against the technical superiority Weber stresses.Bureaucracy and its critics in The Schools of Organization DesignClassical administration1910s to 1940s, and in German to the 1970sWhat it claimsThere are general principles of administration, among them division of work, unity of command, a scalar chain of authority, and a limited span of control, and a structure built to them will be efficient in most settings. Taylor added that planners should set work methods.What it has shownThe school offered reasoning and experience, not tests. Woodward (1965) found that the spans and levels of the more successful firms in her sample differed by production system, and Simon (1946) showed that the principles come in pairs that point in opposite directions.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory found that the structure of successful firms varies with technology and environment, where classical writers treat their principles as general.Classical administration in The Schools of Organization DesignHuman relations and System 41920s to 1960sWhat it claimsOutput depends on the social relations of work, the norms of informal groups, and the style of supervision as much as on formal design. Likert's System 4, overlapping work groups joined by linking-pin managers under participative management, outperforms authoritative systems.What it has shownThe founding evidence is the Hawthorne studies, which later reanalyses dispute (Carey 1967; Levitt and List 2011). Likert's support came largely from his own institute's surveys. Wagner (1994) found participation's effects on performance and satisfaction significant but small.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads human relations as a technique of managerial control rather than a change in the distribution of power.Human relations and System 4 in The Schools of Organization DesignTransaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis1937, then the 1970s to the presentWhat it claimsFirms exist, and are organized as they are, to economize on transaction costs. Hierarchy replaces the market when assets are specific, uncertainty is high, and exchange is frequent, and the multidivisional form should outperform the functional form in large, diversified firms.What it has shownArmour and Teece (1978) found, in United States petroleum firms from 1955 to 1973, a positive relationship between the multidivisional form and profitability while the form was spreading, but not once an equilibrium in organizational form was reached.Who disputes itThe network perspective on organizations: Granovetter argued that the theory undersocializes economic action, which is embedded in networks of personal relations that also produce trust and order.Transaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis in The Schools of Organization DesignThe Carnegie school and the attention-based view1940s to the presentWhat it claimsPeople in organizations are boundedly rational, so structure matters because it sets the premises of their decisions and channels their attention: who sees which problems, which goals they pursue, and which routines they follow. Ocasio makes structure distribute attention.What it has shownMarch and Simon (1958) drew propositions from the existing literature, and Cyert and March (1963) added process models and simulations. Two studies show hierarchy shaping what is sent up as well as what is chosen (Reitzig and Maciejovsky 2015; Keum and See 2017).Who disputes itOrganizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities models a principal and agents with defined objectives; the Carnegie school, firms as coalitions with unresolved goal conflict.The Carnegie school and the attention-based view in The Schools of Organization DesignSocio-technical systems1950s to 1980sWhat it claimsAn organization is a social system and a technical system that must be designed together. The same technology admits more than one way of organizing work, and groups that own a whole task and control its variances at the source perform better and are more satisfied.What it has shownTrist and Bamforth (1951) found that longwall mechanization broke up self-regulating work groups. A review of 134 experiments found them extremely successful overall, and Stewart (2006) linked team autonomy to performance; studies of socialist brigades and Volkswagen qualify it.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory: Kelly argued that labor intensification, not joint optimization, accounts for what socio-technical redesign achieved, and that the part of pay incentives was seriously underestimated.Socio-technical systems in The Schools of Organization DesignThe economics of the labor-managed firm and of enterprise ownership1958 to the presentWhat it claimsA firm run by its workers behaves differently from one run for investors: Ward modeled the Yugoslav-style firm as maximizing income per worker. Hansmann argued that an ownership form's success depends on the balance between the costs of market contracting and of ownership.What it has shownBurdín (2014) found a 29 percent lower hazard of dissolution for Uruguayan worker-managed firms than for conventional ones, and Fakhfakh, Pérotin, and Gago (2012) found French labor-managed firms as productive or more so in every industry studied.Who disputes itOrganizational economics (Jensen and Meckling) contrasts the labor-managed firm, in which tradable residual claims are legally prohibited, with cooperatives and partnerships that arise out of voluntary contracting.The economics of the labor-managed firm and of enterprise ownership in The Schools of Organization DesignModularity and the mirroring hypothesis1960s to the presentWhat it claimsComplex systems are built of nearly decomposable parts, and an organization's structure tends to mirror the architecture of what it makes: modular products allow loosely coupled organizations, and tightly coupled products need tightly coupled teams. Conway's law runs in reverse.What it has shownColfer and Baldwin (2016) review the empirical studies and report both support and principled exceptions. Direct tests point both ways: MacCormack, Baldwin, and Rusnak (2012) found open source products more modular than their commercial pairs; dynamic components break the mirror.Who disputes itNo school in the record disputes it head on; it answers information processing, which meets the coordination load inside the organization; mirroring writers locate it in the product's architecture.Modularity and the mirroring hypothesis in The Schools of Organization DesignStrategy and structure1960s to 1980sWhat it claimsStructure follows strategy: firms that diversify by product or geography outgrow the centralized functional structure and, after a lag and usually a crisis, adopt divisions. Chandler drew this from the histories of DuPont, General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Sears.What it has shownChandler (1962) is comparative business history of four firms set against a wider survey. Rumelt (1974) related diversification and structure to performance, and Egelhoff (1988), with 34 multinationals, found some of Stopford and Wells's relationships supported and others not.Who disputes itInstitutional theory: in Fligstein's model divisions spread with a product-related or unrelated strategy, presidents from sales or finance, and other firms in the industry changing; strategy was one of three.Strategy and structure in The Schools of Organization DesignStructural contingency theory1960s to the presentWhat it claimsThere is no one best structure. Performance depends on fit between structure and contingencies such as environment, technology, size, and strategy, on an open-system view of the organization. Drazin and Van de Ven separate fit as selection, interaction, and systems.What it has shownBurns and Stalker, Woodward, and the Aston group related structure to context; Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) supported selection and systems fit only. Pennings (1975) found that fit did not explain effectiveness; Schoonhoven (1981) found traditional hypotheses unsupported.Who disputes itStrategic choice: Child argued that contingency theory explains structure by the constraints of context and leaves out the political process by which power-holders choose strategic action, structural forms included.Structural contingency theory in The Schools of Organization DesignThe French bureaucratic school (strategic analysis)1960s to 1980sWhat it claimsA bureaucracy is a system of power relations organized around zones of uncertainty. Impersonal rules and centralization protect members from depending on one another, those who control uncertainties hold power, and, unable to correct its errors, it changes only through crisis.What it has shownLe phénomène bureaucratique (1963; English 1964) rests on two case studies, a clerical agency and a state industrial monopoly. L'acteur et le système (1977; English 1980) is theoretical.Who disputes itSocietal effect and comparative business systems: D'Iribarne argues that national logics of conduct, such as a French logic of honor, explain differences that Crozier attributed to power games.The French bureaucratic school (strategic analysis) in The Schools of Organization DesignThe Japanese-firm literature1960s to the presentWhat it claimsThe large Japanese firm coordinates operating decisions through horizontal information sharing among semi-autonomous shops and uses its ranking hierarchy mainly as an incentive scheme (Aoki). It creates knowledge through middle-up-down management (Nonaka and Takeuchi).What it has shownAoki (1986) is a formal model. Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride (1986) compared 51 Japanese and 55 United States manufacturing plants, and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) rest on case studies, chiefly of Japanese firms. Fruin (1994) found the enterprise system defined at three levels.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads shop-floor delegation as control: Sewell and Wilkinson argue that just-in-time and total quality regimes delegate tactical responsibility while centralizing strategic control.The Japanese-firm literature in The Schools of Organization DesignThe Scandinavian and Dutch socio-technical schools1960s to 2000sWhat it claimsThe Scandinavian program sought democracy at work through field experiments with semi-autonomous groups, then through democratic dialogue. The Dutch school's design theory turns complex organizations with simple jobs into simple organizations with complex jobs.What it has shownEmery and Thorsrud reported field experiments in Norwegian industry; Gustavsen (1992) records that they spread less than hoped, his reason for turning to dialogue. Berggren studied work organization in the Swedish auto industry. The Dutch work rests on design cases and argument.Who disputes itThe Japanese-firm literature: defenders of the Toyota system hold that standardized work with employee participation learns faster; Berggren reports Swedish long-cycle plants matching a line plant on productivity.The Scandinavian and Dutch socio-technical schools in The Schools of Organization DesignConfiguration theory1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructures cluster into a small number of internally coherent configurations whose elements reinforce one another, so organizations move between a few types in large jumps, not small steps. Mintzberg's five configurations each rest on one coordinating mechanism.What it has shownDoty, Glick, and Huber (1993) found that fit to Miles and Snow's ideal types predicted effectiveness while fit to Mintzberg's did not. A meta-analysis of 40 tests (Ketchen and colleagues 1997) found that configuration partly explains performance, more so with broad definitions.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Donaldson counters that most organizations sit at intermediate points on a continuum of fits, not in a few configurations, and that studies over time find mostly incremental change.Configuration theory in The Schools of Organization DesignInformation processing1970s to the presentWhat it claimsThe more uncertain the task, the more information must be processed during its execution. An organization either reduces that need, through slack resources or self-contained tasks, or raises its capacity, through vertical information systems or lateral relations up to the matrix.What it has shownGalbraith (1973, 1974) built the framework from cases and from Simon's theory of bounded rationality, and Tushman and Nadler (1978) set it out as an integrating concept for design. Daft and Lengel (1986) argued that structure must reduce equivocality as well as supply data.Who disputes itThe Carnegie school and the attention-based view: Ocasio holds that firm behavior results from how the firm channels and distributes attention, so structure governs where attention goes, not only how much is processed.Information processing in The Schools of Organization DesignLabor process and critical theory1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructure is above all a system of control over labor. Braverman argued that management deskills work by separating conception from execution; Edwards traced a sequence from simple control by the boss to technical control through machines to bureaucratic control through rules.What it has shownHistorical and theoretical (Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979). Delbridge (1995), observing a Japanese-owned plant in England, found that just-in-time and total quality regimes combined the control of labor with management's economic goals more completely than piece rates had.Who disputes itBureaucracy and its critics: Adler argues that labor process theory ignores the progressive socialization of the labor process, which drives long-term skill upgrading, and disputes deskilling as the trend.Labor process and critical theory in The Schools of Organization DesignStrategic choice1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructure is the outcome of choices by those with power in the organization, who decide on strategic action, including the structural form, the manipulation of environmental features, and the performance standards to be met. Context constrains but does not determine structure.What it has shownLargely conceptual: Child (1972) built the argument from gaps in contingency findings, and the empirical case rests mostly on the modest share of structural variance contingencies explain. A 2026 review of 42 studies finds upper echelons theory their main theoretical anchor.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Donaldson replies that organizations mostly adopt the structures their contingencies dictate, to avoid the loss of performance misfit brings, so choice over structure is at most limited.Strategic choice in The Schools of Organization DesignThe German codetermination literature1970s to the presentWhat it claimsWorks councils and employee board seats form a structural layer through which coordination can become negotiation between management and employees. Defenders argue that it supports long-term employment, training, and cooperation; critics, that it weakens shareholder control.What it has shownJäger, Schoefer, and Heining (2021) found board-level codetermination left wages unchanged and, if anything, raised capital formation. Jirjahn (2011) reports studies pointing to positive works council effects; a meta-analysis found codetermination laws tied to lower productivity.Who disputes itOrganizational economics (Gorton and Schmid) found that firms with equal employee and shareholder representation did worse for their shareholders than firms with one-third employee representation.The German codetermination literature in The Schools of Organization DesignOrganizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities1976 to the presentWhat it claimsDesign is the joint choice of who holds which decision rights, how performance is measured, and how it is rewarded. Rights should be placed where the specific knowledge lies, formal authority differs from real authority, and practices are complements that pay off in clusters.What it has shownIchniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) found, on 36 steel finishing lines, that lines using a set of innovative work practices achieved substantially higher productivity, consistent with complementarities. Bloom and colleagues found more decentralization where trust was higher.Who disputes itGhoshal argued that management research has shaped managers' worldview with ideologically inspired amoral theories, built on a scientific model that excludes human intentionality and so denies moral considerations.Organizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities in The Schools of Organization DesignInstitutional theory1977 to the presentWhat it claimsFormal structures are often adopted because they are legitimate in the organization's field, as rationalized myths, and then decoupled from the work done. Organizations in a field grow alike through coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism, whether or not it is efficient.What it has shownTolbert and Zucker (1983) found that city characteristics predicted early but not later adoption of civil service reform, which they read as institutionalization. Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) found support for institutional and economic accounts of late M-form adoption.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Kraatz and Zajac found little support for neoinstitutional predictions in 631 liberal arts colleges, which grew less alike; the change they studied was curricular, not structural.Institutional theory in The Schools of Organization DesignPopulation ecology1977 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations face strong structural inertia, because selection favors the reliability and accountability of stable structures. Change in a population's forms comes mainly from founding and failure, not adaptation, and changing core features resets the liability of newness.What it has shownAmburgey, Kelly, and Barnett (1993) found that the effects of change on the hazard of failure vary by type of change and over time, and that rates of change depend on how often and how recently an organization has changed. Carroll and Hannan (2000) set out the program's methods.Who disputes itFor structural contingency theory, Donaldson argues that ecology understates managers' capacity to adapt structure.Population ecology in The Schools of Organization DesignResource dependence1978 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations depend on outside parties for critical resources, and structure follows the management of that dependence: units that cope with critical dependencies gain power, and boundaries are redrawn through cooptation, joint ventures, and mergers to absorb constraint.What it has shownPfeffer and Salancik (1978) assembled studies of boards, mergers, and joint ventures. A meta-analysis of 157 tests (Drees and Heugens 2013) corroborated the main prediction: organizations meet resource dependencies with interorganizational arrangements that raise their autonomy.Who disputes itTransaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis explains boundaries by efficiency; resource dependence, by power and constraint.Resource dependence in The Schools of Organization DesignThe business-groups literature1978 to the presentWhat it claimsGroups of legally independent firms bound by ownership and social ties are a durable form of their own, neither one firm nor a market. Where institutions function poorly, groups can benefit member firms and can destroy value; they are sometimes paragons, sometimes parasites.What it has shownKhanna and Palepu (2000) found that affiliates of the most diversified Indian groups outperformed unaffiliated firms. A meta-analysis of 141 studies (Carney and colleagues 2011) found that affiliation lowers performance in general, less so where institutions are underdeveloped.Who disputes itOrganizational economics: agency writers read pyramids and cross-holdings as devices that separate control from ownership; Almeida and Wolfenzon offer a financing rationale for pyramids instead.The business-groups literature in The Schools of Organization DesignScandinavian institutionalism1980s to the presentWhat it claimsIdeas of organizing do not diffuse unchanged; they travel and are translated as they are adopted, so a form taken up in one place is not the same form elsewhere. Organizations can also be built of organizations (meta-organizations), which behave differently.What it has shownA discussion paper by Czarniawska and Joerges (1995) contrasts the diffusion of ideas with their translation, drawing on examples such as Swedish municipal reform; the work on meta-organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008) is conceptual.Who disputes itInstitutional theory can read the same processes, seen from a translocal view, as institutional isomorphism, though translation holds that each adopter modifies an idea, so an institution re-created elsewhere is new.Scandinavian institutionalism in The Schools of Organization DesignSocietal effect and comparative business systems1980s to the presentWhat it claimsFirms matched on size, technology, and industry differ systematically by country, because how a society educates, trains, recruits, and promotes its workforce, and its industrial relations, shape how work is divided and supervised, so structure is partly a national product.What it has shownMaurice, Sorge, and Warner (1980) compared closely matched manufacturing units in France, West Germany, and Great Britain and found more pervasive differences in their organization than usually recognized. Whitley (1999) set out a comparative account of business systems.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory stresses culture-free elements of structure; matched comparisons find nationally different shapes of organization.Societal effect and comparative business systems in The Schools of Organization DesignThe network perspective on organizations1985 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations and their members are nodes joined by ties, and the pattern of ties shapes what they can do. Economic action is embedded in networks of personal relations (Granovetter 1985), and network forms are a distinct form, not a hybrid of market and hierarchy (Powell 1990).What it has shownPodolny and Page (1998) review the research and find that network forms foster learning, confer status and legitimacy, bring economic benefits, help manage resource dependencies, and give employees considerable autonomy, and they ask for attention to networks' dysfunctions.Who disputes itTransaction cost economics: Williamson treats the hybrid as a third generic form between market and hierarchy; for Powell, network forms are a distinct form, not a mix of the two.The network perspective on organizations in The Schools of Organization DesignComputational organization design and search1990s to the presentWhat it claimsDesign choices interact, so design space is a rugged landscape with many local peaks, and structure affects how well an organization searches it. Decentralizing interdependent decisions can trap units on poor peaks; temporary decentralization, then reintegration, can help.What it has shownMostly simulation, with one field test: Csaszar (2012), with more than 150,000 stock-picking decisions by 609 mutual funds, found that decision-making structure affects the number of initiatives pursued and the omission and commission errors made.Who disputes itNo school in the record disputes it head on; it disputes structural contingency theory, whose bivariate fit, its simulations show, cannot capture how the best design depends on interactions among choices.Computational organization design and search in The Schools of Organization DesignThe new-forms debate1990s to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations must solve four universal problems (dividing tasks, allocating them, providing rewards, and providing information), and a form is new when it solves them in new ways. Self-managing organizations radically decentralize authority; skeptics hold hierarchy reappears.What it has shownFoss (2003) traced the rise and partial reversal of Oticon's spaghetti organization to the problem of selective intervention. A meta-analysis of 54 studies of 13,914 teams (Greer and colleagues 2018) found that hierarchy within teams on net slightly lowers team performance.Who disputes itBureaucracy and its critics: removing formal structure leaves informal elites whose power is unaccountable (Freeman), and democratic and network organizations are much less hierarchy-free than their labels suggest.The new-forms debate in The Schools of Organization DesignThe algorithmic-management literature2015 to the presentWhat it claimsSoftware does much of the directing, evaluating, and disciplining that managers and rules once did. Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin (2020) call algorithmic control a new contested terrain; Puranam (2021) treats dividing decisions between people and machines as a design problem.What it has shownMostly qualitative field studies of gig work. Wood and colleagues (2019), with 107 interviews in six countries and 679 survey respondents, found that algorithmic management tends to give remote gig workers flexibility and autonomy, but also low pay, isolation, and overwork.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads control at work as contested terrain; Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin take up that view but argue that algorithmic control is distinct from earlier forms.The algorithmic-management literature in The Schools of Organization DesignFunctional structureOrigin: 1911 to 1937.Family: Classical hierarchies.Line and staffOrigin: 1916 to 1943.Family: Classical hierarchies.Multidivisional (M-form) by productOrigin: 1920s practice; named and analyzed 1962 to 1975.Family: Divisionalized forms.Machine bureaucracyOrigin: 1922 (Weber); 1979 (Mintzberg).Family: Classical hierarchies.Divisional by customer or market segmentOrigin: 1937; 2005.Family: Divisionalized forms.Matrix organizationOrigin: 1950s to 1960s practice; analyzed 1971 to 1977.Family: Lateral and multidimensional forms.Co-determined organizationOrigin: 1951 to 1976 (the laws); 1984 to 2022 (the main studies).Family: Forms from other traditions.Socio-technical autonomous work groupsOrigin: 1951 to 1965.Family: Team-based and self-managing forms.Stratified hierarchy (requisite organization)Origin: 1951 to 1989.Family: Classical hierarchies.Cooperative organizationOrigin: 1958 to 1999.Family: Forms from other traditions.Linking-pin organization (System 4)Origin: 1961 to 1967.Family: Team-based and self-managing forms.Divisional by regionOrigin: 1962 to 1972.Family: Divisionalized forms.Adhocracy (innovative organization)Origin: 1968 to 1979.Family: Professional, project, and knowledge forms.J-form (the Japanese firm)Origin: 1968 to 1990.Family: Forms from other traditions.Professional bureaucracyOrigin: 1968 to 1979.Family: Professional, project, and knowledge forms.Holding company (H-form)Origin: 1972 to 1975; 1987.Family: Divisionalized forms.Ambidextrous organizationOrigin: 1976 to 2004.Family: Professional, project, and knowledge forms.Simple structureOrigin: 1979.Family: Classical hierarchies.Hybrid structureOrigin: 1980 to the present.Family: Lateral and multidimensional forms.Missionary (ideological) organizationOrigin: 1980 to 1989.Family: Ideological forms.Network, modular, and virtual organizationOrigin: 1986 to 1990.Family: Network and market-like forms.Transnational and multidimensional organizationOrigin: 1987 to 1989.Family: Lateral and multidimensional forms.Business group (keiretsu, chaebol, family house)Origin: 1988 to 2007.Family: Forms from other traditions.Shamrock organizationOrigin: 1988 to 1989.Family: Network and market-like forms.Federal organizationOrigin: 1989 to 1992.Family: Network and market-like forms.Self-managing organization (less-hierarchical forms)Origin: 1989 to 2017.Family: Team-based and self-managing forms.Boundaryless organizationOrigin: 1990 to 1995.Family: Network and market-like forms.Front-back organizationOrigin: 1990s to 2007.Family: Lateral and multidimensional forms.Professional partnership (P2 form)Origin: 1990.Family: Professional, project, and knowledge forms.The corporate center and shared servicesOrigin: 1991 to 2000.Family: Divisionalized forms.Internal market organizationOrigin: 1993 to 1994.Family: Network and market-like forms.Process (horizontal) organizationOrigin: 1993 to 1999.Family: Lateral and multidimensional forms.Cellular organizationOrigin: 1994 to 1997.Family: Network and market-like forms.Hypertext organizationOrigin: 1994 to 1995.Family: Forms from other traditions.Team-based organizationOrigin: 1995.Family: Team-based and self-managing forms.Project-based organizationOrigin: 2000 to 2006.Family: Professional, project, and knowledge forms.Agile at scaleOrigin: 2001 to 2016.Family: Contemporary and emerging forms.Distributed (all-remote) organizationOrigin: 2002 to 2021.Family: Contemporary and emerging forms.Open-source and community-based organizationOrigin: 2002 to 2007.Family: Contemporary and emerging forms.Algorithmically managed organizationOrigin: 2015 to 2020.Family: Contemporary and emerging forms.Team of teamsOrigin: 2015.Family: Team-based and self-managing forms.

The schools by first year

Bureaucracy and its critics1900s to 1950s, revived from the 1990sWhat it claimsWeber held that rational-legal authority exercised through an office hierarchy, written rules, trained officials, and promotion by qualification is technically superior in precision, speed, and reliability. Critics studied its unintended consequences, Michels's iron law sharpest.What it has shownMerton (1940) argued, with no test, that rules can turn from means into ends; case studies followed. The Aston group concluded that the type's dimensions vary independently, and Wagner's meta-analysis (2021) found that many of their interrelationships have weakened.Who disputes itHuman relations and System 4 sets the costs of impersonal rules to motivation and cooperation against the technical superiority Weber stresses.
Classical administration1910s to 1940s, and in German to the 1970sWhat it claimsThere are general principles of administration, among them division of work, unity of command, a scalar chain of authority, and a limited span of control, and a structure built to them will be efficient in most settings. Taylor added that planners should set work methods.What it has shownThe school offered reasoning and experience, not tests. Woodward (1965) found that the spans and levels of the more successful firms in her sample differed by production system, and Simon (1946) showed that the principles come in pairs that point in opposite directions.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory found that the structure of successful firms varies with technology and environment, where classical writers treat their principles as general.
Human relations and System 41920s to 1960sWhat it claimsOutput depends on the social relations of work, the norms of informal groups, and the style of supervision as much as on formal design. Likert's System 4, overlapping work groups joined by linking-pin managers under participative management, outperforms authoritative systems.What it has shownThe founding evidence is the Hawthorne studies, which later reanalyses dispute (Carey 1967; Levitt and List 2011). Likert's support came largely from his own institute's surveys. Wagner (1994) found participation's effects on performance and satisfaction significant but small.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads human relations as a technique of managerial control rather than a change in the distribution of power.
Transaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis1937, then the 1970s to the presentWhat it claimsFirms exist, and are organized as they are, to economize on transaction costs. Hierarchy replaces the market when assets are specific, uncertainty is high, and exchange is frequent, and the multidivisional form should outperform the functional form in large, diversified firms.What it has shownArmour and Teece (1978) found, in United States petroleum firms from 1955 to 1973, a positive relationship between the multidivisional form and profitability while the form was spreading, but not once an equilibrium in organizational form was reached.Who disputes itThe network perspective on organizations: Granovetter argued that the theory undersocializes economic action, which is embedded in networks of personal relations that also produce trust and order.
The Carnegie school and the attention-based view1940s to the presentWhat it claimsPeople in organizations are boundedly rational, so structure matters because it sets the premises of their decisions and channels their attention: who sees which problems, which goals they pursue, and which routines they follow. Ocasio makes structure distribute attention.What it has shownMarch and Simon (1958) drew propositions from the existing literature, and Cyert and March (1963) added process models and simulations. Two studies show hierarchy shaping what is sent up as well as what is chosen (Reitzig and Maciejovsky 2015; Keum and See 2017).Who disputes itOrganizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities models a principal and agents with defined objectives; the Carnegie school, firms as coalitions with unresolved goal conflict.
Socio-technical systems1950s to 1980sWhat it claimsAn organization is a social system and a technical system that must be designed together. The same technology admits more than one way of organizing work, and groups that own a whole task and control its variances at the source perform better and are more satisfied.What it has shownTrist and Bamforth (1951) found that longwall mechanization broke up self-regulating work groups. A review of 134 experiments found them extremely successful overall, and Stewart (2006) linked team autonomy to performance; studies of socialist brigades and Volkswagen qualify it.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory: Kelly argued that labor intensification, not joint optimization, accounts for what socio-technical redesign achieved, and that the part of pay incentives was seriously underestimated.
The economics of the labor-managed firm and of enterprise ownership1958 to the presentWhat it claimsA firm run by its workers behaves differently from one run for investors: Ward modeled the Yugoslav-style firm as maximizing income per worker. Hansmann argued that an ownership form's success depends on the balance between the costs of market contracting and of ownership.What it has shownBurdín (2014) found a 29 percent lower hazard of dissolution for Uruguayan worker-managed firms than for conventional ones, and Fakhfakh, Pérotin, and Gago (2012) found French labor-managed firms as productive or more so in every industry studied.Who disputes itOrganizational economics (Jensen and Meckling) contrasts the labor-managed firm, in which tradable residual claims are legally prohibited, with cooperatives and partnerships that arise out of voluntary contracting.
Modularity and the mirroring hypothesis1960s to the presentWhat it claimsComplex systems are built of nearly decomposable parts, and an organization's structure tends to mirror the architecture of what it makes: modular products allow loosely coupled organizations, and tightly coupled products need tightly coupled teams. Conway's law runs in reverse.What it has shownColfer and Baldwin (2016) review the empirical studies and report both support and principled exceptions. Direct tests point both ways: MacCormack, Baldwin, and Rusnak (2012) found open source products more modular than their commercial pairs; dynamic components break the mirror.Who disputes itNo school in the record disputes it head on; it answers information processing, which meets the coordination load inside the organization; mirroring writers locate it in the product's architecture.
Strategy and structure1960s to 1980sWhat it claimsStructure follows strategy: firms that diversify by product or geography outgrow the centralized functional structure and, after a lag and usually a crisis, adopt divisions. Chandler drew this from the histories of DuPont, General Motors, Standard Oil of New Jersey, and Sears.What it has shownChandler (1962) is comparative business history of four firms set against a wider survey. Rumelt (1974) related diversification and structure to performance, and Egelhoff (1988), with 34 multinationals, found some of Stopford and Wells's relationships supported and others not.Who disputes itInstitutional theory: in Fligstein's model divisions spread with a product-related or unrelated strategy, presidents from sales or finance, and other firms in the industry changing; strategy was one of three.
Structural contingency theory1960s to the presentWhat it claimsThere is no one best structure. Performance depends on fit between structure and contingencies such as environment, technology, size, and strategy, on an open-system view of the organization. Drazin and Van de Ven separate fit as selection, interaction, and systems.What it has shownBurns and Stalker, Woodward, and the Aston group related structure to context; Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) supported selection and systems fit only. Pennings (1975) found that fit did not explain effectiveness; Schoonhoven (1981) found traditional hypotheses unsupported.Who disputes itStrategic choice: Child argued that contingency theory explains structure by the constraints of context and leaves out the political process by which power-holders choose strategic action, structural forms included.
The French bureaucratic school (strategic analysis)1960s to 1980sWhat it claimsA bureaucracy is a system of power relations organized around zones of uncertainty. Impersonal rules and centralization protect members from depending on one another, those who control uncertainties hold power, and, unable to correct its errors, it changes only through crisis.What it has shownLe phénomène bureaucratique (1963; English 1964) rests on two case studies, a clerical agency and a state industrial monopoly. L'acteur et le système (1977; English 1980) is theoretical.Who disputes itSocietal effect and comparative business systems: D'Iribarne argues that national logics of conduct, such as a French logic of honor, explain differences that Crozier attributed to power games.
The Japanese-firm literature1960s to the presentWhat it claimsThe large Japanese firm coordinates operating decisions through horizontal information sharing among semi-autonomous shops and uses its ranking hierarchy mainly as an incentive scheme (Aoki). It creates knowledge through middle-up-down management (Nonaka and Takeuchi).What it has shownAoki (1986) is a formal model. Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride (1986) compared 51 Japanese and 55 United States manufacturing plants, and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) rest on case studies, chiefly of Japanese firms. Fruin (1994) found the enterprise system defined at three levels.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads shop-floor delegation as control: Sewell and Wilkinson argue that just-in-time and total quality regimes delegate tactical responsibility while centralizing strategic control.
The Scandinavian and Dutch socio-technical schools1960s to 2000sWhat it claimsThe Scandinavian program sought democracy at work through field experiments with semi-autonomous groups, then through democratic dialogue. The Dutch school's design theory turns complex organizations with simple jobs into simple organizations with complex jobs.What it has shownEmery and Thorsrud reported field experiments in Norwegian industry; Gustavsen (1992) records that they spread less than hoped, his reason for turning to dialogue. Berggren studied work organization in the Swedish auto industry. The Dutch work rests on design cases and argument.Who disputes itThe Japanese-firm literature: defenders of the Toyota system hold that standardized work with employee participation learns faster; Berggren reports Swedish long-cycle plants matching a line plant on productivity.
Configuration theory1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructures cluster into a small number of internally coherent configurations whose elements reinforce one another, so organizations move between a few types in large jumps, not small steps. Mintzberg's five configurations each rest on one coordinating mechanism.What it has shownDoty, Glick, and Huber (1993) found that fit to Miles and Snow's ideal types predicted effectiveness while fit to Mintzberg's did not. A meta-analysis of 40 tests (Ketchen and colleagues 1997) found that configuration partly explains performance, more so with broad definitions.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Donaldson counters that most organizations sit at intermediate points on a continuum of fits, not in a few configurations, and that studies over time find mostly incremental change.
Information processing1970s to the presentWhat it claimsThe more uncertain the task, the more information must be processed during its execution. An organization either reduces that need, through slack resources or self-contained tasks, or raises its capacity, through vertical information systems or lateral relations up to the matrix.What it has shownGalbraith (1973, 1974) built the framework from cases and from Simon's theory of bounded rationality, and Tushman and Nadler (1978) set it out as an integrating concept for design. Daft and Lengel (1986) argued that structure must reduce equivocality as well as supply data.Who disputes itThe Carnegie school and the attention-based view: Ocasio holds that firm behavior results from how the firm channels and distributes attention, so structure governs where attention goes, not only how much is processed.
Labor process and critical theory1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructure is above all a system of control over labor. Braverman argued that management deskills work by separating conception from execution; Edwards traced a sequence from simple control by the boss to technical control through machines to bureaucratic control through rules.What it has shownHistorical and theoretical (Braverman 1974; Edwards 1979). Delbridge (1995), observing a Japanese-owned plant in England, found that just-in-time and total quality regimes combined the control of labor with management's economic goals more completely than piece rates had.Who disputes itBureaucracy and its critics: Adler argues that labor process theory ignores the progressive socialization of the labor process, which drives long-term skill upgrading, and disputes deskilling as the trend.
Strategic choice1970s to the presentWhat it claimsStructure is the outcome of choices by those with power in the organization, who decide on strategic action, including the structural form, the manipulation of environmental features, and the performance standards to be met. Context constrains but does not determine structure.What it has shownLargely conceptual: Child (1972) built the argument from gaps in contingency findings, and the empirical case rests mostly on the modest share of structural variance contingencies explain. A 2026 review of 42 studies finds upper echelons theory their main theoretical anchor.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Donaldson replies that organizations mostly adopt the structures their contingencies dictate, to avoid the loss of performance misfit brings, so choice over structure is at most limited.
The German codetermination literature1970s to the presentWhat it claimsWorks councils and employee board seats form a structural layer through which coordination can become negotiation between management and employees. Defenders argue that it supports long-term employment, training, and cooperation; critics, that it weakens shareholder control.What it has shownJäger, Schoefer, and Heining (2021) found board-level codetermination left wages unchanged and, if anything, raised capital formation. Jirjahn (2011) reports studies pointing to positive works council effects; a meta-analysis found codetermination laws tied to lower productivity.Who disputes itOrganizational economics (Gorton and Schmid) found that firms with equal employee and shareholder representation did worse for their shareholders than firms with one-third employee representation.
Organizational economics: decision rights, authority, and complementarities1976 to the presentWhat it claimsDesign is the joint choice of who holds which decision rights, how performance is measured, and how it is rewarded. Rights should be placed where the specific knowledge lies, formal authority differs from real authority, and practices are complements that pay off in clusters.What it has shownIchniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997) found, on 36 steel finishing lines, that lines using a set of innovative work practices achieved substantially higher productivity, consistent with complementarities. Bloom and colleagues found more decentralization where trust was higher.Who disputes itGhoshal argued that management research has shaped managers' worldview with ideologically inspired amoral theories, built on a scientific model that excludes human intentionality and so denies moral considerations.
Institutional theory1977 to the presentWhat it claimsFormal structures are often adopted because they are legitimate in the organization's field, as rationalized myths, and then decoupled from the work done. Organizations in a field grow alike through coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism, whether or not it is efficient.What it has shownTolbert and Zucker (1983) found that city characteristics predicted early but not later adoption of civil service reform, which they read as institutionalization. Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou (1993) found support for institutional and economic accounts of late M-form adoption.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory: Kraatz and Zajac found little support for neoinstitutional predictions in 631 liberal arts colleges, which grew less alike; the change they studied was curricular, not structural.
Population ecology1977 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations face strong structural inertia, because selection favors the reliability and accountability of stable structures. Change in a population's forms comes mainly from founding and failure, not adaptation, and changing core features resets the liability of newness.What it has shownAmburgey, Kelly, and Barnett (1993) found that the effects of change on the hazard of failure vary by type of change and over time, and that rates of change depend on how often and how recently an organization has changed. Carroll and Hannan (2000) set out the program's methods.Who disputes itFor structural contingency theory, Donaldson argues that ecology understates managers' capacity to adapt structure.
Resource dependence1978 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations depend on outside parties for critical resources, and structure follows the management of that dependence: units that cope with critical dependencies gain power, and boundaries are redrawn through cooptation, joint ventures, and mergers to absorb constraint.What it has shownPfeffer and Salancik (1978) assembled studies of boards, mergers, and joint ventures. A meta-analysis of 157 tests (Drees and Heugens 2013) corroborated the main prediction: organizations meet resource dependencies with interorganizational arrangements that raise their autonomy.Who disputes itTransaction cost economics and the M-form hypothesis explains boundaries by efficiency; resource dependence, by power and constraint.
The business-groups literature1978 to the presentWhat it claimsGroups of legally independent firms bound by ownership and social ties are a durable form of their own, neither one firm nor a market. Where institutions function poorly, groups can benefit member firms and can destroy value; they are sometimes paragons, sometimes parasites.What it has shownKhanna and Palepu (2000) found that affiliates of the most diversified Indian groups outperformed unaffiliated firms. A meta-analysis of 141 studies (Carney and colleagues 2011) found that affiliation lowers performance in general, less so where institutions are underdeveloped.Who disputes itOrganizational economics: agency writers read pyramids and cross-holdings as devices that separate control from ownership; Almeida and Wolfenzon offer a financing rationale for pyramids instead.
Scandinavian institutionalism1980s to the presentWhat it claimsIdeas of organizing do not diffuse unchanged; they travel and are translated as they are adopted, so a form taken up in one place is not the same form elsewhere. Organizations can also be built of organizations (meta-organizations), which behave differently.What it has shownA discussion paper by Czarniawska and Joerges (1995) contrasts the diffusion of ideas with their translation, drawing on examples such as Swedish municipal reform; the work on meta-organizations (Ahrne and Brunsson 2008) is conceptual.Who disputes itInstitutional theory can read the same processes, seen from a translocal view, as institutional isomorphism, though translation holds that each adopter modifies an idea, so an institution re-created elsewhere is new.
Societal effect and comparative business systems1980s to the presentWhat it claimsFirms matched on size, technology, and industry differ systematically by country, because how a society educates, trains, recruits, and promotes its workforce, and its industrial relations, shape how work is divided and supervised, so structure is partly a national product.What it has shownMaurice, Sorge, and Warner (1980) compared closely matched manufacturing units in France, West Germany, and Great Britain and found more pervasive differences in their organization than usually recognized. Whitley (1999) set out a comparative account of business systems.Who disputes itStructural contingency theory stresses culture-free elements of structure; matched comparisons find nationally different shapes of organization.
The network perspective on organizations1985 to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations and their members are nodes joined by ties, and the pattern of ties shapes what they can do. Economic action is embedded in networks of personal relations (Granovetter 1985), and network forms are a distinct form, not a hybrid of market and hierarchy (Powell 1990).What it has shownPodolny and Page (1998) review the research and find that network forms foster learning, confer status and legitimacy, bring economic benefits, help manage resource dependencies, and give employees considerable autonomy, and they ask for attention to networks' dysfunctions.Who disputes itTransaction cost economics: Williamson treats the hybrid as a third generic form between market and hierarchy; for Powell, network forms are a distinct form, not a mix of the two.
Computational organization design and search1990s to the presentWhat it claimsDesign choices interact, so design space is a rugged landscape with many local peaks, and structure affects how well an organization searches it. Decentralizing interdependent decisions can trap units on poor peaks; temporary decentralization, then reintegration, can help.What it has shownMostly simulation, with one field test: Csaszar (2012), with more than 150,000 stock-picking decisions by 609 mutual funds, found that decision-making structure affects the number of initiatives pursued and the omission and commission errors made.Who disputes itNo school in the record disputes it head on; it disputes structural contingency theory, whose bivariate fit, its simulations show, cannot capture how the best design depends on interactions among choices.
The new-forms debate1990s to the presentWhat it claimsOrganizations must solve four universal problems (dividing tasks, allocating them, providing rewards, and providing information), and a form is new when it solves them in new ways. Self-managing organizations radically decentralize authority; skeptics hold hierarchy reappears.What it has shownFoss (2003) traced the rise and partial reversal of Oticon's spaghetti organization to the problem of selective intervention. A meta-analysis of 54 studies of 13,914 teams (Greer and colleagues 2018) found that hierarchy within teams on net slightly lowers team performance.Who disputes itBureaucracy and its critics: removing formal structure leaves informal elites whose power is unaccountable (Freeman), and democratic and network organizations are much less hierarchy-free than their labels suggest.
The algorithmic-management literature2015 to the presentWhat it claimsSoftware does much of the directing, evaluating, and disciplining that managers and rules once did. Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin (2020) call algorithmic control a new contested terrain; Puranam (2021) treats dividing decisions between people and machines as a design problem.What it has shownMostly qualitative field studies of gig work. Wood and colleagues (2019), with 107 interviews in six countries and 679 survey respondents, found that algorithmic management tends to give remote gig workers flexibility and autonomy, but also low pay, isolation, and overwork.Who disputes itLabor process and critical theory reads control at work as contested terrain; Kellogg, Valentine, and Christin take up that view but argue that algorithmic control is distinct from earlier forms.

The forms by first year

Functional structure: 1911 to 1937
Line and staff: 1916 to 1943
Multidivisional (M-form) by product: 1920s practice; named and analyzed 1962 to 1975
Machine bureaucracy: 1922 (Weber); 1979 (Mintzberg)
Divisional by customer or market segment: 1937; 2005
Matrix organization: 1950s to 1960s practice; analyzed 1971 to 1977
Co-determined organization: 1951 to 1976 (the laws); 1984 to 2022 (the main studies)
Socio-technical autonomous work groups: 1951 to 1965
Stratified hierarchy (requisite organization): 1951 to 1989
Cooperative organization: 1958 to 1999
Linking-pin organization (System 4): 1961 to 1967
Divisional by region: 1962 to 1972
Adhocracy (innovative organization): 1968 to 1979
J-form (the Japanese firm): 1968 to 1990
Professional bureaucracy: 1968 to 1979
Holding company (H-form): 1972 to 1975; 1987
Ambidextrous organization: 1976 to 2004
Simple structure: 1979
Hybrid structure: 1980 to the present
Missionary (ideological) organization: 1980 to 1989
Network, modular, and virtual organization: 1986 to 1990
Transnational and multidimensional organization: 1987 to 1989
Business group (keiretsu, chaebol, family house): 1988 to 2007
Shamrock organization: 1988 to 1989
Federal organization: 1989 to 1992
Self-managing organization (less-hierarchical forms): 1989 to 2017
Boundaryless organization: 1990 to 1995
Front-back organization: 1990s to 2007
Professional partnership (P2 form): 1990
The corporate center and shared services: 1991 to 2000
Internal market organization: 1993 to 1994
Process (horizontal) organization: 1993 to 1999
Cellular organization: 1994 to 1997
Hypertext organization: 1994 to 1995
Team-based organization: 1995
Project-based organization: 2000 to 2006
Agile at scale: 2001 to 2016
Distributed (all-remote) organization: 2002 to 2021
Open-source and community-based organization: 2002 to 2007
Algorithmically managed organization: 2015 to 2020
Team of teams: 2015

Twenty-three of the 29 schools run to the present, and 16 of those began in the 1970s or later. The forms arrive in waves: 14 of the 41 first appear between 1985 and 1994.

Source: Fayol 1949; Weber 1978; Mayo 1933; Trist and Bamforth 1951, an interview-based field study in one industry; Burns and Stalker 1961, a field study of twenty firms; Mintzberg 1979; Child 1972a; Coase 1937; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Hannan and Freeman 1977; Galbraith 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Crozier 1963; Emery and Thorsrud 1969; Yoshino 1968; Streeck 1984a; Kellogg and colleagues 2020, a review of earlier research through one theoretical lens, with no new data; Puranam and colleagues 2014, a conceptual argument; Chandler 1962, several independent case histories by a historian; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Simon 1946; Maurice and colleagues 1980, a comparison of matched factories in three countries; Levinthal 1997; Simon 1962; Braverman 1974; Hamilton and Biggart 1988, a comparison of three economies by scholars; Ward 1958; Czarniawska and Joerges 1995; Granovetter 1985.

In Measurement of Responsibility (1956) Jaques proposed the maximum time span of discretion as a measure of the level of work. A General Theory of Bureaucracy (1976) bounded the strata by bands of time span, and a 1986 paper set out stratified systems theory. Requisite Organization (1989) gave the approach its best-known name, and "In Praise of Hierarchy" (1990) put the case to managers.

How many layers an organization needs, and where to put them, was the problem it answered. The older answer was the span of control. Graicunas (1933) showed that the relationships a superior must keep in mind rise steeply with each subordinate and concluded that outside routine work a superior should have at most five. Jaques rejected the rule and derived the layers from the work.

Where it fits

One rating, size, rests on theory, and the rest on our judgment from named premises; no study located tests this form against any factor.

The stratified hierarchy (requisite organization) against the twelve contingency factors

Each factor at its three levels, Fits, Partial, or Strain; select a row for its reason, sources, and grade.

Select a factor to read its reason, sources, basis, and grade.Size. Setting layers by the time span of each role matters most where there are many layers to set; a small firm has only a stratum or two. Basis: Theory. Grade: conceptual only, no empirical test. Sources: Jaques 1990; Graicunas 1933; Rajan and Wulf 2006; Wulf 2012.Age. Old organizations tend to multiply their levels as they grow, and the strata design measures the layers a role structure requires; reading the form as a correction for accumulated layers, and young roles as too fluid to measure by time span, is our judgment. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Jaques 1990; Greiner 1972.Environmental uncertainty (unpredictability, dynamism). Layers set by time span settle accountability, not speed; as change speeds up, decisions still climb a deep chain one stratum at a time, so the argument made for hierarchies in general applies here by family. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Galbraith 1973; Jaques 1990; Burton and Obel 2004; Schoonhoven 1981; Pennings 1975.Environmental complexity. The number of layers follows the complexity of the work itself, so environmental complexity alone does not favor or strain the form. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976; Burton and Obel 2004.Munificence and hostility. Layers sized to the work hold under any resource level; Burton and Obel lower organizational complexity, which includes vertical differentiation, under both high and extreme hostility and raise centralization only under extreme hostility, which bears on how many layers are kept, a matter the form decides on other grounds. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Burton and Obel 2004; Jaques 1976.Diversity of products and markets. Layers are set by the time span of each role, whatever the business mix; diversity does not settle the form. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976.Strategy type. Layers of managerial oversight help screening and execution but hurt idea generation, which favors exploitation, though the strata are set by time span, not strategy, and the form's medium formalization falls short of the design Burton and Obel give a defender. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Keum and See 2017; Lee 2022; Jaques 1976; Burton and colleagues 2020a; Burton and Obel 2004. View 1: Defender (exploitation) fits, Analyzer (exploitation and exploration) partial, Prospector (exploration) partial. Layers of managerial oversight help screening and execution but hurt idea generation, which favors exploitation. Sources: Keum and See 2017; Lee 2022. View 2: Defender (exploitation) partial, Analyzer (exploitation and exploration) partial, Prospector (exploration) partial. Burton and Obel give a defender high formalization and centralization and a functional design, which a hierarchy of medium formalization and mixed centralization meets only in part, and Jaques sets strata by the time span of the work, not by strategy. Sources: Burton and Obel 2004; Jaques 1976.Technology and routineness. Jaques sets the number of strata by the time span of roles, not by technology, and in larger organizations technology was not related to the wider hierarchy; Woodward found organizational characteristics, levels of management among them, varying with the production system, so whether layering is independent of technology is disputed, and routineness moves at least the width of spans. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976; Graicunas 1933; Burton and Obel 2004; Woodward 1965; Hickson and colleagues 1969.Interdependence. A manager one stratum up can set standards and plans for pooled and sequential work; peers who must adjust to each other continuously need lateral relations, which Jaques defines beside the manager line, as collateral and coordinating relationships, task forces, and project teams, so the form can supply them, though its layers are built for the manager line. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973; Jaques 1976; Jaques 1989.Knowledge intensity and professionalization. Layers set by the complexity of each role apply to most work, a knowledge hierarchy layers problem solvers by how hard the problems are, and organizations requiring higher qualifications had more managerial levels, with authority decentralized. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Garicano 2000; Blau 1968.Global integration pressure. No work read ties the stratified hierarchy to integration pressure across countries, so this factor gives no reason for or against. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976; Lincoln and colleagues 1986; Maurice and colleagues 1980.Local responsiveness pressure. No work read ties the stratified hierarchy to local responsiveness across countries, so this factor gives no reason for or against. Basis: Judgment. Sources: Jaques 1976.

Counting the one contested cell, strategy type, by its first view, the 36 settings read Fits at 11, Partial at 24, and Strain at 1. Eleven of the twelve factor cells rest on judgment.

Source: Jaques 1990; Graicunas 1933, a conceptual argument with no test; Rajan and Wulf 2006, a panel study of more than 300 large firms; Wulf 2012, a summary for managers of the author's multi-firm panel studies, with interviews and time-use data; Greiner 1972, a conceptual model with no systematic test; Galbraith 1973; Burton and Obel 2004; Schoonhoven 1981, a quantitative study of hospital operating room suites; Pennings 1975, a quantitative field test of the structural-contingency model; Jaques 1976; Keum and See 2017, a field study combined with an experiment; Lee 2022, a quantitative study of many start-ups in one industry; Burton and colleagues 2020a; Woodward 1965, a survey of a hundred manufacturing firms with case studies; Hickson and colleagues 1969, a multi-organization comparative survey; Thompson 1967; Jaques 1989; Garicano 2000; Blau 1968, a comparison of 250 government agencies, replicating an earlier study of 150; Lincoln and colleagues 1986, a survey of about a hundred plants in two countries; Maurice and colleagues 1980, a comparison of matched factories in three countries.

Your own situation against the stratified hierarchy (requisite organization)

Set any factor to outline its cell in the strip above; the lines under the switches give the counts, the form's place among the 41, and the misfit rules that fire.

Size

Age

Environmental uncertainty (unpredictability, dynamism)

Environmental complexity

Munificence and hostility

Diversity of products and markets

Strategy type

Technology and routineness

Interdependence

Knowledge intensity and professionalization

Global integration pressure

Local responsiveness pressure

Set: 0 of 12 factors. Fits on 0, Partial on 0, Strain on 0, Contested on 0.

Its place in the explorer's rankingEvery factor is on Any: all 41 forms tie, and the explorer lists them alphabetically.1st of 411st of 41, tied with one other1st of 41, tied with 0 othersSunk by a misfit rule: 1st of 41Sunk by a misfit rule: 1st of 41, tied with one otherSunk by a misfit rule: 1st of 41, tied with 0 others

Flagged (it meets the form only through part of its profile): One way of working for very different parts of the environment. Source: Lawrence and Lorsch 1967a; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967b.

Ranking rule: by count of Fits on the factors the reader has set, then fewest Strains, then alphabetical; a fired misfit rule that no source disputes sinks the form to the bottom when every level of the form's profile meets it, a disputed one, or one that meets the form only through one end of a spanned level, one view of a contested profile cell, or one part of a two-part form, is flagged on the row (with both views where it is disputed), and a misfit between two of the reader's own settings is shown once above the list; a contested cell counts only where its views agree at the reader's level, and otherwise shows as Contested; factors on "Any" count for nothing; with every factor on "Any" the list is alphabetical and says so.

Open these settings in the explorer

The misfit rules that can fire for this form

One way of working for very different parts of the environment fires when Environmental complexity at Complex: flagged (it meets the form only through part of its profile). Source: Lawrence and Lorsch 1967a; Lawrence and Lorsch 1967b.

Of the 39 contingency misfit rules, only one can fire for this form, and it would flag the form, not sink it.

Source: Burton and Obel 2004; Burton and colleagues 2020a.

Size. Fits medium and large organizations; partial small (theory). Setting layers by time span matters where there are many layers to set (Jaques 1990; Graicunas 1933). Rajan and Wulf (2006), a panel study of more than 300 large firms, and Wulf (2012), a summary of the author's panel studies, found layers removed but did not test Jaques's rule.
Age. Fits established and old; partial young. Levels multiply as a company grows (Greiner 1972, a conceptual model with no systematic test), and Jaques (1990) sets the layers a role structure requires; reading the form as a correction for accumulated layers, and young roles as too fluid to measure, is our judgment. DeSantola, Gulati, and Zhelyazkov (2023), a longitudinal study of thousands of young ventures, found divergent paths in the functions added, not one sequence; it did not measure layers.
Environmental uncertainty. Fits stable, partial shifting, strain unpredictable. Our reading, argued for hierarchies in general: time-span layers settle accountability, not speed (Galbraith 1973; Burton and Obel 2004, the most developed scholarly fit model). Schoonhoven (1981), a quantitative study of hospital operating room suites, found traditional contingency hypotheses drawn from Galbraith unsupported and more precise interactive, nonmonotonic ones better supported; she tested work units and named no form, so she is a limit, not a test. So is Pennings (1975), a quantitative field test of the structural-contingency model: the fit between environmental uncertainty and structure did not explain effectiveness.
Environmental complexity, munificence, and diversity. Partial throughout, our reading: the layers follow the complexity of the work, not the environment or the business mix (Jaques 1976). Burton and Obel (2004) count vertical differentiation in organizational complexity, which they would lower under high and extreme hostility; how that meets the strata is judgment.
Strategy. Contested. One view, our reading: fits defender, partial analyzer and prospector, because oversight helps screening and execution but hurts idea generation (Keum and See 2017, a field study with an experiment; Lee 2022, a study of many start-ups in one industry), with exploration mapped to the prospector after Burton, Obel, and Håkonsson (2020); neither study measures strata. The other: partial throughout, because Burton and Obel (2004) give a defender high formalization and centralization, which this form meets only in part, and Jaques sets strata by the work, not strategy (Jaques 1976).
Technology. Partial throughout, our reading: Jaques sets the strata by time span, not technology, and routineness moves at least the width of spans (Graicunas 1933; Burton and Obel 2004). Against it, Woodward's (1965) successful firms, in a survey of a hundred manufacturing firms with case studies, differed in spans and levels by production system (reading that as routineness is our judgment); for it, Hickson, Pugh, and Pheysey (1969), a multi-organization comparative survey, found technology unrelated to the hierarchical structure of larger organizations.
Interdependence. Fits pooled and sequential; partial reciprocal. Our reading: peers who must adjust continuously need lateral relations, which Jaques (1976, 1989) defines beside the manager line, though the layers are built for that line (Thompson 1967; Galbraith 1973).
Knowledge intensity. Fits at every level, our reading: Garicano (2000) layers problem solvers by how hard the problems are, and Blau (1968), a comparison of 250 government agencies, found agencies requiring higher qualifications had more managerial levels, with authority decentralized. Limits: public agencies only, and decentralized authority is not the accountability one stratum up that this form stresses.
Global integration and local responsiveness pressure. Partial throughout, as neutral values, our reading: no work read ties the form to either, and Jaques (1976) is cited only for what the form is. Limits on integration, not responsiveness: Lincoln, Hanada, and McBride (1986), a survey of about a hundred plants in two countries, found taller hierarchies in Japanese plants, and the societal-effect school (Maurice, Sorge, and Warner 1980, a comparison of matched factories in three countries) holds that structure is partly a national product.

What it does well

It gives a rule for the number of layers: a layer that adds no step in time span has no reason to exist (Jaques 1990).

Each manager is tied to a real difference in the work, as Goold and Campbell's (2002) redundant hierarchy test asks of every level: that it rest on a knowledge and competence advantage.

What it costs

Every role has to be measured before the layers can be set, and independent tests of the measure are few: Carraher and Chait (1999) is one of the few located, and it tests pay, not layers.

By our reading, it adds nothing for speed: exceptions still climb the line one stratum at a time.

The theory has one author at its center, with most of the work Jaques's own, and Kelly (1968) gave Glacier's theory of organization a book-length critical examination.

How it fails

How the stratified hierarchy (requisite organization) fails, and the coordination failures behind it

The entry's failure modes at the left, each tied to the Coordination Failures patterns it names at the right; a pattern links its entry there.

Signal attenuation up the hierarchy Constraint drift across delegation Diffused responsibility Authority-gradient suppression Regulator overload

How many ties the failure has. Highest: Layers that only relayAccountability that blurs where layers do not match the workIdeas held back on the way upThe chain of command becomes the bottleneckSignal attenuation up the hierarchyConstraint drift across delegationDiffused responsibilityAuthority-gradient suppressionRegulator overload

Select a failure to read its place in the network.Layers that only relay. Degree 2Accountability that blurs where layers do not match the work. Degree 1Ideas held back on the way up. Degree 1The chain of command becomes the bottleneck. Degree 1Signal attenuation up the hierarchy. Degree 1Constraint drift across delegation. Degree 1Diffused responsibility. Degree 1Authority-gradient suppression. Degree 1Regulator overload. Degree 1

Failure	Degree
Layers that only relay	2
Accountability that blurs where layers do not match the work	1
Ideas held back on the way up	1
The chain of command becomes the bottleneck	1
Signal attenuation up the hierarchy	1
Constraint drift across delegation	1
Diffused responsibility	1
Authority-gradient suppression	1
Regulator overload	1

Four failure modes name five patterns, and no pattern is named by more than one.

Source: Jaques 1990; Goold and Campbell 2002a; Reitzig and Maciejovsky 2015, a field study combined with experiments; Galbraith 1973; Galbraith 1974; Jaques 1976; Jaques 1989.

Layers that only relay. Where layers outnumber the strata of work, managers relay information, each adding delay: signal attenuation up the hierarchy and constraint drift across delegation. The design exists to correct this, in theory (Jaques 1990; Goold and Campbell 2002). By our reading, the form fails this way when strata are named but never measured.

Accountability that blurs where layers do not match the work. Too many or too few layers produce compression or gaps in accountability, the problem the form was built to answer. We link it to diffused responsibility, where no one owns the integrated outcome. Theory, untested in the studies located.

Ideas held back on the way up. Reitzig and Maciejovsky (2015), a field study combined with experiments, found evaluation apprehension and perceived lack of control leading middle managers to pass fewer suggestions up a growing hierarchy, though other mechanisms push the other way. We link this to authority-gradient suppression; a suggestion is not always disconfirming information, and the study does not test strata.

The chain of command becomes the bottleneck. As task uncertainty rises, hierarchy, rules, and goals are overloaded (Galbraith 1973, 1974); a line that carries the load through the chain of command alone meets regulator overload. Theory. Jaques (1976, 1989) defines lateral relationships beside the line, so Galbraith's overload misfit rules do not fire on this form.

Of the misfit rules, one fires, undisputed: one way of working for very different parts of the environment, our judgment from Lawrence and Lorsch's (1967) multi-firm comparative field study of functionally organized firms: in a complex environment, departments facing very different parts of it run on the same goals, time horizons, and rules. It flags the form but does not sink it: low differentiation meets the rule, and spanned grouping only at its function or process end.

The rule pairs one factor with one structure, the interaction form of fit, which Drazin and Van de Ven (1985), a quantitative study of 629 work units, found unsupported, unlike the selection and systems forms. Pennings (1975), a quantitative field test of the structural-contingency model, found the fit between environment and structure did not explain effectiveness, and Mohr (1971), a quantitative field study of technology and structure, found effectiveness not determined by the consonance of technology and structure, though his structure was subordinates' participation in decisions; both test the model as a whole, not this pairing, and Donaldson (2001) argues such early failures came from methodological limitations. Volberda and colleagues (2012), a survey of 1,904 companies, found contingency and institutional fit complementary, so a firing rule does not by itself show that moving toward fit will help a firm whose structure its field treats as legitimate.

On the other side, Burton, Lauridsen, and Obel (2002), a quantitative study of 224 Danish small and medium-sized firms, found firms with misfits had lower return on assets, and Donaldson (1987), a quantitative study of firms over time, found support for propositions linking diversification, reorganization, and performance, and found strategy seldom adjusted to fit structure.

What the research found

The structural claim, that layers should match time-span strata, has no large-sample test located: a search of the major journals from 2010 to 2026 found none.

The Changing Culture of a Factory (1951), one long-term case study of a single company, reports collaborative consultation, not controlled comparison, and predates the time-span ideas.

Carraher and Chait (1999), a quantitative study of two samples of public employees, 152 in all, found amount of work predicted actual pay and that felt-fair pay was stable over three months.

Graicunas's (1933) span rule is a conceptual argument with no test. Meier and Bohte (2003), a quantitative study of hundreds of public organizations, found in 678 Texas school districts that Gulick's diversity of function, time, and space help determine spans of control but mean different things at different levels of the hierarchy; it does not test Jaques's rule. Most recent filed under this form is Lee (2022), a quantitative study of many start-ups in one industry, which found a flatter hierarchy can improve creative success but can lead to haphazard execution and commercial failure; it measures layers and oversight, not strata.

The schools disagree about what sets the layers. Classical administration held a limited span to be a general principle. Simon (1946) answered that such principles come in contradictory pairs, like proverbs. For contingency research, successful structures vary with technology and environment (Woodward 1965; Burns and Stalker 1961, a field study of twenty firms), though the Aston reappraisal found technology unrelated to the hierarchical structure of larger organizations (Hickson, Pugh, and Pheysey 1969), and Child and Mansfield (1972), a multi-firm comparative study of 82 business organizations, found size related to structure much more strongly than technology. For the human relations school, informal groups and supervision shape output whatever the formal design (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939), evidence later reanalyses dispute (Franke and Kaul 1978, a statistical reanalysis of one experiment's data). In organizational economics, team theory and the knowledge-based hierarchy rank the hierarchy by knowledge, not authority (Garicano 2000).

The evidence ledger holds 11 studies filed under this form.

In practice: one published case

The Glacier Metal Company, as Jaques (1951) describes it, is one case study. Glacier was a British manufacturer of plain bearings used mainly in the motor industry. In 1948 the Tavistock Institute of Human Relations chose it for a study of the sources of group stress in industry, financed by the Human Factors Panel of the Committee on Industrial Productivity, and the work became known as the Glacier Project.

From April 1948 to November 1950 the research team worked with the London factory on problems as they arose. Among them were morale problems tied to a change from piece rates to hourly wages in the Service Department, and the Works Council's growing aspiration to be the factory's policy-making body.

Wilfred Brown, the company's chairman and managing director, later described its concepts and methods of organization and management as four systems: executive, representative, appeals, and legislative (Brown 1960).

The sources' conclusions are not recorded: the concluding chapters of Jaques (1951) and Brown (1960) were searched, not read in full. The search, through Crossref and the web for Jaques and Brown, the Glacier Metal Company, the Glacier Project, requisite organization case studies, and time-span studies, also found a site listing practitioner case studies, which are not scholarly sources and were not used.

Source: Jaques 1951. The Changing Culture of a Factory, Tavistock Publications, London (xvii and 341 pages); one long-term case study of a single company.

Variants and near relatives

Glacier system. The executive, representative, appeals, and legislative systems Glacier Metal developed with Jaques and its chairman Wilfred Brown, each defined in the company's policy document (Brown 1960). It joins the stratified line to formal employee representation, so the executive line is one of four systems, not the whole structure.

Layered modular structure for project-based firms (Worren 2018). Worren adapts requisite organization to flexible, project-based firms that rely on teams and horizontal coordination and plan less far ahead, combining requisite organization with the modular organization into a layered structure. Only the chapter's abstract was read.

Knowledge-based hierarchy (Garicano 2000). Production workers learn the most common or easiest problems, and specialized problem solvers above them take the harder ones, so levels are ordered by knowledge, not span or headcount.

The machine bureaucracy is the nearest neighbor. It standardizes the work process through analysts, which, on our reading, fixes no rule for the number of layers; Jaques (1989) calls the received notions about span of control misguided. The stratified hierarchy derives its layers from a measured property of each role, the time span of discretion.

Other relatives: the functional structure is a choice of grouping only, and a functional firm can be stratified; line and staff separates the line's right to command from the staff's right only to advise, where this form sets how many layers the line has; and the linking-pin organization joins levels through managers who belong to two groups, while this form joins them through one accountable manager.

The stratified hierarchy beside its nearest neighbor, the machine bureaucracy

Select a number to fill what it marks in both drawings; the list under them gives the dimensions on which the two profiles differ.

It derives the number of managerial layers from a measured property of each role, the time span of discretion, whereas the machine bureaucracy standardizes the work process through analysts, which, on our reading, fixes no rule for the number of layers; Jaques (1989) calls the received notions about span of control misguided.

Stratified hierarchy (requisite organization)

Reports toAdjust to each other directlyDDirect supervision

Machine bureaucracy

Reports toAdvises, or reports indirectlyWStandardization of work processes

Each manager in the stratified hierarchy sits one stratum above the roles it heads, a step set by the time span of discretion; on our reading, nothing fixes how many layers the machine bureaucracy's middle line holds.
A manager one stratum up, accountable for subordinates' output, coordinates by direct supervision; analysts beside the machine bureaucracy's line coordinate it by standardizing the work.
Lateral role relationships, and in Jaques (1989) task forces and project teams, join roles in different units of the stratified hierarchy; the machine bureaucracy's functions meet only at the strategic apex.
The stratified hierarchy may group a stratum by function or by product, since the theory is silent on the horizontal basis; the machine bureaucracy groups by function throughout.

Differs on 8 of 11 dimensions

Basis of grouping Function or process and product or purpose; Machine bureaucracy: Function or process
Specialization Medium; Machine bureaucracy: High
Standardization and formalization Medium; Machine bureaucracy: High
Centralization Mixed; Machine bureaucracy: Centralized
Layers and span of control Moderate; Machine bureaucracy: Tall
Decision rights and the locus of authority Vertical and horizontal centralization; Machine bureaucracy: Limited horizontal decentralization
Prime coordinating mechanism Direct supervision; Machine bureaucracy: Standardization of work processes
Lateral mechanisms Direct contact and liaison roles to task forces and teams; Machine bureaucracy: Hierarchy, rules, and goals only

Both forms run authority down a single line of managers. The stratified hierarchy sets each layer where the time span of discretion crosses one of Jaques's boundaries, and the machine bureaucracy standardizes the work through analysts and, on our reading, fixes no rule for the number of layers.

Source: Jaques 1990; Jaques 1976; Jaques 1989; Mintzberg 1980, a synthesis of earlier research, offering propositions without a new test.

Moving into or out of it

By our reading, the sequence is to measure every role's time span, draw the strata, and remove or merge layers that fall inside one stratum. No study here measures the cost of the move; at Glacier the ideas developed over years of consultation (Brown 1960).

The evidence on removing layers comes from firms that did not use Jaques's rule. Rajan and Wulf (2006), a panel study of more than 300 large firms, read more managers reporting to the chief executive as delegation of authority. Wulf (2012), a summary of the author's panel studies with interviews and time-use data, found pay changes suggesting some delegation but more control at the top. Both measure reporting lines and pay, not decisions, so by our reading cutting layers to the strata will not by itself settle where decisions go.

The flattening findings, sorted by which reading they support

Select a finding, then the column it belongs in, or show the sort. The records' limits: Rajan and Wulf measured reporting lines and pay, not how decisions were made; Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf counted titles reporting to the chief executive; Wulf's interviews cover seven firms, her time-use firms are much smaller than the panel firms, and the time-use survey records no decisions.

Items (select one, then a box)

Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top
Not placedPlacedDelegationBoth readingsControl at the top

Findings

Three studies

Delegation

Both readings

Control at the top

DelegationBoth readingsControl at top

Which reading the finding supports

Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.Select a finding, then the column it belongs in.More direct reports.Not placed yet.More direct reports.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.More direct reports.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Rajan and Wulf (2006) found the number of positions reporting directly to the chief executive rose significantly over time, and Wulf (2012) found firms widening the chief executive's span of control. The same studies read the change as delegation and as control, so the count alone settles neither.More direct reports.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.Fewer levels below CEO.Not placed yet.Fewer levels below CEO.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.Fewer levels below CEO.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Rajan and Wulf (2006) found fewer levels between division heads and the chief executive, and Wulf (2012) found firms removing layers. Rajan and Wulf conclude that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Fewer levels below CEO.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.Division heads made officers.Not placed yet.Division heads made officers.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.More of the managers reporting directly to the chief executive were made officers of the firm, which Rajan and Wulf (2006) read as delegation of authority.Division heads made officers.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Division heads made officers.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.Pay hinting at delegation.Not placed yet.Pay hinting at delegation.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.Wulf (2012) found firms changed pay in ways suggesting some decisions were delegated to division managers. Rajan and Wulf (2006), one of the panel studies she summarizes, found division managers who moved closer to the chief executive received higher pay and greater long-term incentives.Pay hinting at delegation.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Pay hinting at delegation.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.Functional managers added.Not placed yet.Functional managers added.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.Functional managers added.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Functional managers added.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.The executive team doubled in size, driven mainly by functional managers rather than general managers, which Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call functional centralization.Division pay lower.Not placed yet.Division pay lower.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.Division pay lower.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Division pay lower.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.Wulf (2012) found division managers were paid less when functional managers joined the top team.Flattened to get closer.Not placed yet.Flattened to get closer.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.Flattened to get closer.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.Flattened to get closer.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.In Wulf's (2012) interviews with seven chief executives of Fortune 500 companies, chief executives said they had flattened to get closer to the businesses.CEO time spent inside.Not placed yet.CEO time spent inside.Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.CEO time spent inside.Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.CEO time spent inside.Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.In time-use data on 65 chief executives, those of flattened firms spent more time on internal interactions (Wulf 2012).

Your sort matched 0 of 8.Your sort matched 1 of 8.Your sort matched 2 of 8.Your sort matched 3 of 8.Your sort matched 4 of 8.Your sort matched 5 of 8.Your sort matched 6 of 8.Your sort matched 7 of 8.Your sort matched 8 of 8.

Delegation: Rajan and Wulf (2006) read more managers reporting to the chief executive and being made officers of the firm as delegation of authority.
Both readings: Rajan and Wulf (2006) concluded that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.
Control at the top: Wulf (2012) found that flattened firms showed more control and decision making at the top, and Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call the executive team's growth functional centralization.

The sort

More direct reports: Both readings. Rajan and Wulf (2006) found the number of positions reporting directly to the chief executive rose significantly over time, and Wulf (2012) found firms widening the chief executive's span of control. The same studies read the change as delegation and as control, so the count alone settles neither.
Fewer levels below CEO: Both readings. Rajan and Wulf (2006) found fewer levels between division heads and the chief executive, and Wulf (2012) found firms removing layers. Rajan and Wulf conclude that flattening cannot be characterized simply as centralization or decentralization.
Division heads made officers: Delegation. More of the managers reporting directly to the chief executive were made officers of the firm, which Rajan and Wulf (2006) read as delegation of authority.
Pay hinting at delegation: Delegation. Wulf (2012) found firms changed pay in ways suggesting some decisions were delegated to division managers. Rajan and Wulf (2006), one of the panel studies she summarizes, found division managers who moved closer to the chief executive received higher pay and greater long-term incentives.
Functional managers added: Control at the top. The executive team doubled in size, driven mainly by functional managers rather than general managers, which Guadalupe, Li, and Wulf (2014) call functional centralization.
Division pay lower: Control at the top. Wulf (2012) found division managers were paid less when functional managers joined the top team.
Flattened to get closer: Control at the top. In Wulf's (2012) interviews with seven chief executives of Fortune 500 companies, chief executives said they had flattened to get closer to the businesses.
CEO time spent inside: Control at the top. In time-use data on 65 chief executives, those of flattened firms spent more time on internal interactions (Wulf 2012).

The shape change itself, a wider span at the top and fewer layers, fits both readings. They part on who joined the top team, how pay moved, and how chief executives spent their time and explained the change.

Source: Rajan and Wulf 2006, a panel study of more than 300 large firms; Wulf 2012, a summary for managers of the author's multi-firm panel studies, with interviews and time-use data; Guadalupe and colleagues 2014, a panel study of many large firms.

Moving out, by our reading of Galbraith (1973, 1974), means a strategy for an overloaded hierarchy beyond the task forces and teams Jaques defines: integrating roles or a matrix where reciprocal work outgrows them, or self-contained units.

Change & Transformation explains how to run a reorganization.

The thinking behind it

Elliott Jaques (1917 to 2003): the time span of discretion (1956); stratified systems theory (1986), hypotheses that cognitive states measured in time horizons recur at higher strata; and requisite organization (1989), one managerial stratum per band of time span.

Wilfred Brown (1960): the Glacier system. V. A. Graicunas (1933): the arithmetic of span of control. Luis Garicano (2000): the knowledge-based hierarchy. Nicolay Worren (2018): the project-based variant.

Jay Galbraith (1974): the information processing view, behind the bottleneck mode. James Thompson (1967): interdependence and coordination, behind the interdependence cell. Paul Lawrence with Lorsch (1967): differentiation and integration, the source of the misfit rule that fires. Richard Burton and Børge Obel (2004): a multi-contingency model with explicit fit and misfit rules, synthesized from the literature. Joan Woodward (1965): spans and levels by production system, which the Aston reappraisal limited to structure close to the workflow.

Also called

Requisite organization, the time-span hierarchy, and the Glacier model. Jaques writes of stratified systems theory (1986) and managerial hierarchy (1990); Brown (1960) of the Glacier Metal Company's executive system.

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